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ABSTRACT
In the late summer of 1982, the United States government sent a 
contingent of Marines to Lebanon to participate in a multinational peacekeeping 
mission that included forces from France, Italy, and, eventually, Great Britain. 
American intervention in Lebanon, which lasted for eighteen months, is most 
often remembered for the suicide bombing of the Marine barracks on October 
23,1983 that killed 241 Americans.
This thesis attempts to place what happened on October 23 in the larger 
context of American involvement in Lebanon. Despite the contentions of some 
authors, the bombing was not an inexplicable aberration. American forces were 
under siege long before the incident, but the Reagan administration repeatedly 
ignored the dangers confronting them. From the outset, American objectives in 
Lebanon were not clearly defined. President Ronald Reagan and his advisers 
wanted to stabilize the Lebanese government while orchestrating the withdrawal 
of all foreign forces from the country. They unrealistically believed that a 
contingent of 1,200 Marines would facilitate these policies.
Rather than helping the United States government in the region, the 
presence of the Marines in Beirut became a liability. The administration claimed 
that the Americans were neutral peacekeepers, but in reality, they provided 
direct support to the government of Lebanon, arming and training soldiers loyal 
to President Amin Gemayel. In the fall of 1983, American ships even began to 
fire on targets that purportedly threatened the Lebanese Armed Forces.
American intervention in Lebanon between 1982 and 1984 was truly one 
of worst debacles in the history of American foreign relations. An examination 
of American policy during this time will hopefully contribute to a more complete 
understanding of the tragedy that unfolded on October 23.
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Introduction: One Bloody Sunday In Beirut
In the late summer of 1982, the United States government sent a 
contingent of Marines to Lebanon to participate in a multinational peacekeeping 
mission that included forces from France, Italy, and, eventually, Great Britain. 
American intervention in Lebanon, which lasted for eighteen months, is most 
often remembered for the attack on the Marine compound at Beirut 
International Airport. Shortly after 6:20 in the morning on October 23, 1983, a 
yellow Mercedes truck entered the parking lot on the southern side of the 
Battalion Landing Team Headquarters. The driver of the truck circled the lot, 
gunned the engine, and accelerated towards the building where approximately 
350 Marines were sleeping. The truck rolled over wire fences and swerved 
around several defensive barriers before ramming into the building's lobby. As 
he took cover, Lance Corporal Eddie DiFranco, one of the few surviving 
witnesses, managed to get a brief glimpse of the driver. "He looked right at me 
. . . smiled, that's it . . .  . Soon as I saw [the truck] over here, I knew what was 
going to happen," he later reported,! Less than a minute later, another suicide 
bomber demolished the French barracks in Beirut. The second attack killed 58
i DiFranco quoted in Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Crusade of Modern Islam 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), 71; for the best introduction to the Beirut attack 
and its aftermath, see David C. Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story 
of America's War Against Terrorism (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 125-160; for the 
Pentagon report on the incident, see Report O f The DOD Commission On Beirut 
International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 20 December 1983), 32-33; Benis M. Frank, U.S. Marines In Lebanon, 
1982-1984 (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. 
Marine Corps, 1987), 1-2; see also Thomas L. Friedman, "Buildings Blasted; Truck 
Loaded With TNT Wrecks Headquarters of a Marine Unit," The New York Times, 24 
October 1983: A l.
2
3French paratroopers . 2 The subsequent FBI investigation revealed that the bomb 
at the American barracks contained twelve thousand pounds of explosives, 
which made it possible to rip the entire four-story concrete structure off its 
foundation.
Initial reports placed the American death toll at 161, but that number 
would eventually rise to 241. Those who survived the attack will always 
remember what happened on that Sunday morning in Beirut. "As soon as we 
got up," recalled Lance Corporal Robert Calhoun, "you heard [what seemed to 
be] about a thousand people screaming, 'Help me. God help m e/ " 3  Lance 
Corporal Michael Petit, who had been sleeping in a building just north of the 
compound on October 23, vividly described the horrible scenes that followed the 
explosion: "Everywhere I looked I saw bodies sprawled in gruesome positions. 
One Marine, still in his sleeping bag, hung from a tree. The decapitated body of 
another was under a jeep, his arms twisted at an impossible angle. The legs of 
yet another jutted from beneath a huge slab of concrete . . . .  That was the most 
devastating moment of my life."4 In addition to those killed in action, over a 
hundred Americans were injured in the attack. Lieutenant Colonel Howard 
Gerlach survived, but he could no longer move his arms or legs. After coming 
out of a coma, Gerlach asked his wife what had happened to his immediate 
subordinates and learned that they were all dead.5
2 "2 Buildings Razed; Early-Morning Blasts Flit Command Structures Where 
Troops Slept," The New York Times, 23 October 1983: A l; Wright, 72.
3 Calhoun quoted in Wright, 70.
4 Michael Petit, Peacekeepers at War: A  Marine's Account of the Beirut Catastrophe 
(Boston: Faber and Faber, 1986), 5-6.
5 Martin and Walcott, 128.
4In writing about his experiences in Beirut, Petit concludes that "it grows 
increasingly unlikely [with the passage of time] that anyone will ever be able to 
entirely identify the motives behind the conflict."6 There is considerable truth to 
this statement, but in a larger sense, of course, it is the obligation of historians to 
ascertain these motives. Understanding Lebanon is by no means an easy task. 
The following analysis attempts to place the barracks bombing in the larger 
context of American involvement in Lebanon. More than anything else, my 
objective is to dismiss the argument that October 23 was somehow an 
aberration. According to military historian Eric Hammel, the attack "was an 
incident that had very little to do with and was wholly apart from the actual fact 
of our 'presence' in Lebanon or, indeed, of the Lebanese civil war. Rather, I 
believe, the bombing was the direct outgrowth of our leaders' having made 
available a target of unprecedented magnitude in the center of a chaotic 
- situation."7 From Hammel's perspective, in other words, the tragedy resulted 
from faulty military decisionmaking. If the Marines had been more widely 
dispersed on the ground, the tragedy could have been averted. This type of 
reasoning, however, obscures the reality of the situation in Beirut. In truth, the 
Marines had been moved to a central location in order to better protect them 
from snipers and mortar rounds. American forces were under siege long before 
October 23, but the Reagan administration repeatedly ignored the dangers 
confronting them.
General John W. Vessey, Jr., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
6 Petit, ix.
7 Eric Hammel, The Root: The Marines in Beirut August 1982-Tebruary 1984 (San 
Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), xxvii.
5under Reagan, has explained that the fundamental flaw of American intervention 
in Lebanon was the idea "that things were going to get better." 8 Many observers 
have noted that Lebanon was the Vietnam of the 1980s. This description is 
intriguing in many ways, but it is also somewhat misleading. Contrary to the 
declarations of the Reagan administration after the barracks bombing, the 
Marines had initially entered the country for reasons not directly related to the 
Cold War. The Soviet Union became an issue only when Reagan was compelled 
to defend the peacekeeping mission against its opponents. Moreover, most 
American soldiers in Vietnam at least had a basic understanding of their 
objectives. In Lebanon, on the other hand, the Marines had widely disparate 
interpretations of the reasons for their deployment. When journalist Thomas L. 
Friedman asked the final contingent of Marines leaving Beirut in 1984 to describe 
the mission that they had been sent to perform, he received a variety of 
responses. Some reported that they were guarding the Beirut International 
Airport. One Marine claimed that the objective was to bring religious freedom to 
the people of Lebanon. Yet the most honest and direct response came from 
Sergeant Jeffery Roberts: "The mission turned out to be a lot more than it was 
originally supposed to be. It got so big and broad it sort of sucked up 
everything. People asked me why I was here. I really can't tell them. It was just 
to be here. It was a political thing."9
The failure of American intervention in Lebanon can be attributed to many
8 Vessey quoted in Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of A Lifetime (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 357.
9 Roberts quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, "America's Failure In Lebanon," The 
New York Times Magazine, 8 April 1984: 44, 62.
6factors. Since its inception in September 1982, the mission lacked clarity and 
direction. In the words of Colin Powell, who served as the military aide to 
Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, "Beirut wasn't sensible and never did 
serve a purpose. It was goofy from the beginning."10 The Reagan 
administration publicly described the Marine contingent as a neutral 
peacekeeping force. In reality, however, the Marines provided support to the 
government of Lebanon, arming and training soldiers loyal to President Amin 
Gemayel. The United States became increasingly supportive of the Gemayel 
government, and in the fall of 1983, the navy fired on Suq-al-Gharb in order to 
defend the Lebanese Armed Forces against the Druze militia. The Pentagon 
commission that investigated the barracks bombing found considerable 
disagreement over the relationship between the decision to shell Suq-al-Gharb 
and October 23. While some officials believed that they were unrelated, the 
Pentagon investigation revealed that "[t]he prevalent view within the 
USCINCEUR [Commander-in-Chief, Europe] chain of command, however, is 
that there was some linkage between the two events."11
Historians will never know for sure what motivated the attacks on the 
French and American forces in Lebanon. In the aftermath of the bombings, 
intelligence reports implicated both Iran and Syria. Defenders of Reagan's 
foreign policy argue that October 23 was orchestrated by Iranian terrorists with a 
long-standing grudge against the United States. It is entirely likely that the 
suicide attackers received assistance from radical groups in Iran and Syria, but in
10 Powell quoted in Cannon, 354.
11 Report Of The DOD Commission, 42.
7the final analysis, they needed to have support within Lebanon in order to 
successfully execute their mission. What happened on that gruesome Sunday 
morning in Beirut was much more than an extension of the Iranian Revolution; it 
was an attempt to permanently drive the United States out of Lebanon.
The tragedy of American involvement in Lebanon is that one truck bomb 
completely reversed foreign policy. After the deadly explosion, Reagan declared 
that the continued presence of the Marines was "central to our credibility on a 
global scale." i2 He repeatedly invoked the specter of communism in the 
following months to justify the peacekeeping mission. If the Gemayel 
government collapsed, he reasoned, Lebanon would certainly fall under the 
influence of Syria, which received backing from the Soviet Union. A communist 
dominated Lebanon would not only threaten Israel but the entire Middle East. 
At the beginning of February 1984, however, Reagan and his top advisers made 
the decision to withdraw from Lebanon. Abandoning the peacekeeping mission 
did not give rise to Soviet domination of the Middle East, and ironically, Syrian 
soldiers have remained in Lebanon to the present day.
By any standard of measurement, Lebanon is truly one of the worst 
debacles in the history of American foreign relations. According to Reagan 
biographer Lou Cannon, "[t]he story of the Reagan administration's 
involvement in Lebanon is a case study of foreign policy calamity." 13 Perhaps the 
greatest tragedy of American intervention was that it exacerbated the problem 
of Middle Eastern terrorism. Many observers have depicted October 23 as the
12 Reagan quoted in Francis X. Clines, "Reagan Declares Marines' Role Is 'Vital'
To Counter Soviet In Lebanon; Toll At 192," The New York Times, 25 October 1983: Al.
13 Cannon, 340.
8tragic ending of a misguided venture into a foreign land, but in many ways, the 
incident was only the beginning. In a recent PBS interview, Robert McFarlane, 
Reagan's National Security Adviser at the time of the barracks bombing, made 
the following observation about terrorism during the Reagan presidency: 
"[terrorists] leanied that the American people can be traumatized by terrorism, 
that it can create pressure on the government, and that our governm ent's] 
response in the 1980s tended to be rather conventional and heavy-handed." 14 in 
the case of Lebanon, terrorist groups discovered that they had more control over 
American foreign policy than they had previously imagined.
*  ic *
C. Vann W oodward long ago warned about "[t]he twilight zone that lies 
between living memory and written history."15 So far, Lebanon has received 
surprisingly little attention from historians, and as a result, I am fully aware of 
the dangers presented by the so-called twilight zone. Since a substantial portion 
of the documents pertaining to American intervention in Lebanon remain 
classified, I have relied extensively on newspaper articles and memoirs when 
piecing together my narrative. I supplemented these sources with unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertations, journal articles, and monographs. During the early stages of 
this project, for instance, George Ball's assessment of American policy in Lebanon 
was particularly helpful.
I have attempted to make the most of the sources that I found, but it is
14 Robert McFarlane, PBS Frontline Target America Interview; transcript 
retrieved December 30, 2001 from the World Wide Web: http: /  /  www.pbs.org/ 
w gbh/pages/ frontline/ shows/ target/in terview s/mcfarlane.html.
15 C. Vann W oodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, third rev. ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1974), xvi.
9important to keep in mind that definitive conclusions cannot be formulated until 
more government documents are de-classified. Hopefully, this thesis will be a 
helpful starting point for researchers who come after me. The first chapter 
examines how the United States became involved in Lebanon during the 
summer of 1982, and it traces the evolution of Reagan's policies through the 
bombing of the American embassy in Beirut in April 1983. The second chapter 
begins with the May 17 agreement and ends with the withdrawal of American 
forces in 1984.
Chapter 1: "No Reverse Gear"
Lebanon is a quagmire. Anyone there will get drawn 
deeper and deeper into the engulfing morass .—Yitzhak Rabin1
If President Ronald Reagan and his administration had responded more 
decisively during the summer of 1982, American intervention in Lebanon would 
have been unnecessary. Secretary of State Alexander Haig's sympathy for Israel 
clouded his judgment, and although it is unclear whether he provided direct 
approval for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 6, he certainly could have 
done more to prevent the attack. On the day after Anwar Sadat's funeral in 
October 1981, Haig had spoken with Prime Minister Menachem Begin in Egypt. 
According to Haig's account of this meeting, Begin informed him that Israel was 
planning a military operation against targets associated with the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon. Haig told Begin that the United 
States could not support the plan. "If you move, you move alone," he 
reportedly said. "Unless there is a major, internationally recognized provocation, 
the United States will not support such an action."2 But when Begin pushed him 
on the matter, promising that the incursion would be relatively minor, Haig's 
response was much more ambiguous. He said that the proposal might be 
sensible from an Israeli perspective, but he reminded Begin that "Israel will be 
alone if it carries out such a plan."3
In the months that followed Haig's encounter with Begin, Israel continued
1 Rabin quoted in George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: M y Years as Secretary of 
State (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993) 233.
2 Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), 326.
3 Ibid., 327.
10
11
to develop plans for an invasion of Lebanon. General Ariel Sharon, Israel's 
Defense Minister, even shared these proposals with State Department officials 
while visiting the United States. Sharon said that Israel was considering two 
possible strategies. While the first would simply eradicate the PLO in southern 
Lebanon, the second entailed a full-scale offensive that would umte the Israelis 
and the Christian Phalange in Beirut. Haig immediately recognized the gravity 
of the situation. "It was clear that Sharon was putting the United States on 
notice: one more provocation by the Palestinians and Israel would deliver a 
knockout blow to the PLO," he later recalled.4 Haig told Sharcn that the United 
States could not sanction the invasion unless it was for the purpose of self 
defense. As George Ball has pointed out, however, Haig could have threatened 
to withhold military funding from Israel in order to deter Sharon's hawkish 
tendencies.^ In the spring of 1982, the Reagan administration allowed Israel tc 
give orders to the United States. The situation required decisive action, but the 
responses emanating from the White House reflected a shocking level of 
hesitancy. Sharon haughtily declared to Haig that "[n]o one has the right to tell 
Israel what decision it should take in defense of its people."** Rather than 
standing his ground and reminding Sharon that Israel's strength was dependent 
on continued American assistance, Haig yielded to Sharon's intimidation tactics.
Israel finally had a reason to execute their war plans when terrorists shot 
Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London on June 3, 1982. Ironically, the
4 Ibid., 335.
5 George W. Ball, Error and Betrayal in Lebanon: An Analysis of Israel's Invasion of 
Lebanon and the Implications for U.S.-Israeli Relations (Washington, D.C.: Foundation For 
Middle East Peace, 1984), 35.
6 Haig, 335.
12
group responsible for the attempted assassination opposed the leadership of 
Yasser Arafat, but the Israelis were unconcerned with the distinction.7 The 
following day Israel launched an air strike against a stadium in Beirut where the 
PLO stored weapons When the PLO opened fire on settlements in northern 
Israel to retaliate, they played directly into the hands of Begin and Sharon,’* On 
the morning of June 6, three divisions of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attacked 
Lebanon. Contrary to the expectations of many experts, however, Israel did not 
restrict "Operation Peace For Galilee" to PLO targets in southern Lebanon. The 
IDF quickly established air supremacy, but despite their initial gains, they were 
unable to capture the strategic Beirut-Damascus Highway.Q The Israelis engaged 
Syrian forces, pushed northward, and surrounded Beirut by the middle of June. 
Rather than directly attacking Beirut, Sharon decided to bombard the city. The 
IDF cut off the city's supply of water and electricity, extensively bombed West 
Beirut horn June to August, and repeatedly broke cease fires. During the final 
phase of the bombardment, Israel intentionally targeted residential and 
commercial areas, and over 90% of the casualties that resulted were non-
combatants. io
President Reagan reacted slowly to Israel's protracted siege of Beirut. At 
the beginning of August, the United Nations ordered a cease-fire, which the 
United States supported. But when Israel ignored the resolution, the Reagan
7 Ball, 36.
8 Dan Bavly and Eliahu Salpeter, Fire In Beirut: Israel's War in Lebanon with the 
PLO (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), 12.
9 Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War, trans. Ina Friedman (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 132.
to Michael Jansen, The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon (London: Zed 
Press, 1982), 49.
13
administration seemed reluctant to alienate Begin. After Israel assented to a 
peace agreement on August 11 that had been arranged by Ambassador Philip 
Habib, the United States special envoy to the Middle East, Sharon responded on 
the next day with an eleven hour air campaign that killed an estimated three 
hundred peopled! Sharon's defiance led Reagan to personally intervene in the 
situation. Appalled by the bloody television reports coming out of Beirut, 
Reagan told Begin in a phone call that the bombing had to end. According to 
Reagan's description of the conversation in his memoirs, "I used the word 
'Holocaust' deliberately and said the symbol of his country was becoming 'a 
picture of a seven month old baby with its arms blcv n off/ "12 These were 
certainly harsh words from the American president, and not sur prisingly, Begin 
ordered an immediate halt to the bombing of West Beirut. Habib's negotiations 
now moved forward more easily, eventually producing an agreement for the 
withdrawal of PLO guerrillas from Beirut. Supporters of Reagan have 
commended him for acting so assertively with Begin. One wonders, however, 
why Reagan did not intervene earlier. By the time he placed a phone call to 
Begin in August, the IDF had been in Lebanon for over two months. Using 
sophisticated American equipment, Israel had killed a countless number of 
civilians and left thousands homeless. Yet Reagan and his administration did 
nothing of any substance until public opinion shifted against the Israeli invasion 
in August. If Reagan had called Begin two months earlier on June 12, when 
Israel's military intentions became abundantly clear, it is entirely possible that a
11 Ball, 45.
12 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 428.
14
great deal of the violence could have been averted. Moreover, swifter 
intervention on the part of the Reagan administration would have made it less 
necessary to involve the Marines.
As many of his biographers have noted, however, Reagan avoided conflict 
whenever possible. This decisionmaking strategy would have deadly 
consequences in Lebanon. From the beginning of July, Habib had urged Reagan 
to commit American forces to assist with the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut. 
He believed that the United States could maintain the peace by taking a position 
between the IDF and the PLO. In retrospect, a peacekeeping contingent from the 
United Nations probably would have been the better option, but at the time, 
Israel opposed such a plan. Arafat made it clear that the PLO would not 
withdraw from Lebanon without protection from the Israeli attack, and 
interestingly enough, he suggested that the United States could provide the 
safety needed for his departure.13 Habib supported this proposal, and he 
promised Arafat that the United States would protect the Palestinians who would 
remain in the country. Reagan finally ordered eight hundred Marines to Beirut 
on August 20 to oversee the removal of PLO guerrillas. After arriving in the Port 
of Beirut, the Marines installed several checkpoints in the immediate area. At 
Checkpoint 54, trucks filled with Arafat's men stopped for a brief inspection. The 
Marines observed while a Lebanese civilian made sure that the men were not 
carrying any weapons other than AK-47s and handguns. After passing through 
the checkpoint, the trucks proceeded to the awaiting ships. PLO fighters fired
13 Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut To Jerusalem (New York: Farrar Straus 
Giroux, 1989), 190.
15
their weapons in the air as they departed, but for the most part, the evacuation 
process went smoothly. By the first week of September, the remainder of the 
PLO had made their exit.14
The success of the mission was impressive by any standard. In less than 
two weeks, the Marines managed to safely remove over 10,000 PLO combatants 
along with Yasser Arafat. The Marines had achieved their objective, and taking 
the advice of both Vessey and Weinberger, Reagan approved their withdrawal 
on September 10. The Reagan administration now had good reason to fee1 
optimistic about the future of Lebanon as well as the Middle East. While 
vacationing in California, Reagan delivered a televised speech in which he 
outlined his plans for Middle East peace. The September 1 speech later became 
known as the Reagan Plan, and in essence, it involved three underlying 
principles. It called on Israel to halt further settlement of the West Bank and to 
return much of the land that they acquired in 1967. In addition, Reagan 
proposed that the Palestinians should receive their own government, which 
would be developed under the guidance of Jordan.15 Begin immediately 
denounced the Reagan Plan in front of the Knesset, declaring that Israel would 
never relinquish the West Bank and Gaza. "We have no reason to get on our 
knees. No one will determine for us the borders of the Land of Israel," he 
proclaimed.16 Many Arab leaders, however, responded enthusiastically to 
Reagan's announcement. Jordan's King Hussein described the plan as "the most
14 For a description of the PLO evacuation, see Hammel, 21-29.
15 Cannon, 355.
1(5 Begin quoted in Ball, 53.
16
courageous stand taken by an American administration since 1956." 17 In reality, 
Reagan's peace initiative did nothing to bring stability to the Middle Bast. The 
settlement programs increased, the American loans to Israel kept flowing, and 
the administration essentially abandoned the plan that Secretary cf State George 
Shultz, who replaced Haig at the end of June, had worked so hard to develop.
Although the first week of September was a time of unprecedented hone, 
subsequent events would quickly reveal that this optimism was nothing more 
than an illusion. On the afternoon of September 14, Bashir Gemayel, the 
president-elect of Lebanon, began a speech to his Phalange supporters but never 
finished it. A bomb exploded in the apartment above the political gathering, 
killing Gemayel and several of his close followers. 18 Gemayel had been an ally of 
both the United States and Israel. Shortly before Gemayel's assassination, 
Secretary of Defense Weinberger met with him while visiting Beirut. 
Weinberger claims that Gemayel wanted the United States government to "use 
Lebanon as its strategic outpost in the Middle East." 19 Gemayel understood the 
significance of Cold War politics, and it appears that his conversation with 
Weinberger was an attempt to exploit American fears of Soviet domination in 
the region. American soldiers stationed in Lebanon could be used to block the 
spread of communism while bringing peace and stability to his country. The 
Reagan administration would later say that Lebanon was an area of immense 
strategic importance, but if the country truly had such a pivotal role in
17 King Hussein quoted in Cannon, 355.
is Schiff and Ya'ari, 247.
19 Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting For Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon 
(New York: W arner Books, 1990), 146.
17
geopolitics, it is hard to explain why Weinberger dismissed Gemayel's proposal 
without even considering it.
The m urder of Bashir Gemayel set in motion a chain of events that would 
lead to the second American intervention in Lebanon. On the day after the 
assassination, the IDF moved into West Beirut. The Israeli commander permitted 
Phalange militiamen to enter the Sabra and Shatila refugee settlements, which 
housed thousands of impoverished Palestinians. The militiamen explained to the 
Israelis that they were searching for terrorists, and beginning on September 16, 
they proceeded to massacre hundreds of the people living in the camps while the 
Israelis did nothing. It remains uncertain how many v/ere slaughtered in the 
three day rampage, but some place the death toll at over 1,000. Tragicall}7, a 
significant number of those killed were women and children.20 In the aftermath 
of the massacre, Ariel Sharon resigned from his position amid considerable 
controversy. While Israel received much of the blame for what happened at 
Sabra and Shatila, Reagan officials had their own reasons to feel guilty. Philip 
Habib had promised Arafat that the Marines would guarantee the safety of those 
that remained in Beirut after the evacuation. Rather than leaving the Marines in 
Lebanon, however, Reagan pulled them out after only seventeen days, thirteen 
days earlier than expected. Everyone recognized that the tragedy could have 
been avoided if the Marines had not left the area. More than anything else, the 
feelings of guilt and embarrassment contributed to the second deployment of 
Marines. Robert McFarlane essentially admitted this during a symposium at
20 Jansen, 106; see also Schiff and Ya'ari, 250-285; for the best contemporary 
account of the massacre, see Thomas L. Friedman, "The Beirut Massacre: The Four 
Days," The New York Times, 26 September 1982: Section 1, page 19.
18
Quantico in 1993. According to his recollection of events, the Marines returned to 
Lebanon in what was nothing more than a "feel good mission, an apology really; 
a way of showing support without much recognition of the vulnerabilities that 
you were creating at the time."21
President Reagan formally announced on September 20 that the Marines 
would return to Lebanon. Unlike the previous mission, it is important to 
emphasize that the new objectives were not entirely clear. In a letter to Robert 
Dillon, the American Ambassador to Lebanon, Deputy-Prime Minister Fouad 
Boutros officially requested that the United States send 1,200 military personnel 
to Lebanon as part of a multinational "interposition force" to "facilitate the 
restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut 
area, and thereby further efforts of my government to assure the safety of 
persons in the area and bring to an end the violence which has tragically 
recurred."22 How the multinational force was supposed to accomplish this 
mission remained a m b i g u o u s  23 The letter from Boutros is particularly revealing 
in that it proposes a close relationship between the Lebanese Armed Forces 
(LAF) and the United States. The Reagan administration would repeatedly 
contend that the Marines stationed in Lebanon were neutral and that they were 
there only to preserve the peace. Yet according to conditions established by
21 McFarlane quoted in John Benson Matthews, "United States Peacekeeping In 
Lebanon 1982-1984: Why It Failed" (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Washington State 
University, 1994), 55.
22 Fouad Boutros to Robert Dillon, 25 September 1982, Ronald Reagan Library 
(White House Staff and Office Files: Bums, William J.: Box 91834, 31 January 1984, CPPG 
Meeting), 1-2.
23 Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, Twin Pillars To Desert Storm: 
America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush (New York: William 
Morrow and Company, 1993), 216.
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Boutros, the Americans were asked to "operate in close coordination with the 
L A F ." 2 4  in  order to solidify the alliance between the two forces, liaison officers 
would be exchanged between them. Ambassador Dillon quickly sent a reply to 
Boutros in which he accepted the conditions that had been outlined in the letter.25
The Joint Chiefs of Staff developed a mission statement for the second 
deployment of Marines that did not clarify the diplomatic notes exchanged on 
September 25. The stated objective of American forces was "[tjo establish an 
environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their 
responsibilities in the Beirut area . . . .  [and] to occupy and secure positions along 
a designated section of the line from south of the Beirut International Airport to a 
position in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace." 26 During the next fourteen 
months, the mission statement was modified only four times.27 The available 
evidence suggests that the Reagan administration agreed to the formation of the 
second multinational force for political reasons. If the future stability of Lebanon 
was critical to American interests in the Middle East, it remains unclear why 
Reagan authorized the insertion of only 1,200 servicemen. What is even more 
puzzlingly is the fact that no one gave much thought to the implementation of 
the mission on the ground. According to John Benson Matthews, "the stated 
mission was ill-conceived, ill-defined and improperly executed." 28 When asked to 
describe the goals of the mission, officials within the White House frequently
24 Fouad Boutros to Robert Dillon, 25 September 1982, 2.
25Robert Dillon to Fouad Boutros, 25 September 1982, Ronald Reagan Library 
(White House Staff and Office Files: Bums, William J.: Box 91834, 31 January 1984, CPPG 
Meeting), 1-2.
26 Report O f The DOD Commission, 35.
27 Ibid., 37.
28 Matthews, v.
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gave contradictory answers. "Since no one seemed to know just what the 
[M]arines were supposed to do nor was any clarification made later/' argued 
George Ball, "the terms of their projected stay was left in great confusion with 
the Administration shifting carelessly from one formulation to a n o t h e r . "2 9
Despite the confusion, administration officials claimed that the Marines and 
their counterparts in the multinational force were peacekeepers. In essence, they 
were misleading the American public by only telling half of the story. The 
Marines arrived in Lebanon to preserve the peace and to uphold the government 
of Amin Gemayel, Bashir's brother. Given the size of the American force, both 
objectives were unrealistic from the beginning. Moreover, by forming a close 
alliance w ith the Lebanese Armed Forces, the United States was by no means a 
neutral and disinterested party to the ongoing conflict within Lebanon. Shortly 
after the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, an American military team visited 
Beirut in order to evaluate the LAF. The leader of the delegation was Major 
General Gerald T. Bartlett, and since he had helped to train forces in Saudi Arabia, 
the military viewed him as a Middle East expert. Published in November, the so- 
called Bartlett Report held that the LAF could maintain the peace after eighteen 
months of training and could patrol the country's borders within three years.3° 
The Bartlett Report closely resembled the military assessments performed during 
the early years of the Vietnam War. While addressing strategic concerns like 
manpower and weaponry, it did not adequately consider the unique historical 
circumstances that pervaded the Lebanese conflict. Some military officials have
29 BaU, 62. 
30Matthews, 99.
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also questioned the facts contained in the report. Colonel Patrick Collins has 
publicly admitted the duplicity of the military review performed in the fall of 
1982: "We came to the conclusion, after visiting every bloody company in the 
Lebanese Army, that Mahatma Gandhi and Jesus Christ couldn't get that army 
together in two years if they had the wind behind them. The army did not exist, 
and the Bartlett Report was a bunch of baloney "31
By the time Bartlett and his colleagues announced their findings, the 
Marines had been in Lebanon for nearly two months. The report did not 
significantly alter their mission, but in December, they began to provide basic 
training to the LAF.32 More importantly, the idea that the LAF could uphold the 
peace on their own within eighteen months contributed to an illusion that is 
indicative of American foreign policy in the twentieth century. Provide a foreign 
army with American weaponry and training, according to this logic, and it is only 
a matter of time before that army can create a country favorable to American 
interests. Yet as the United States learned in the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam, a large 
group of men with guns cannot make a nation if they lack popular support. The 
Reagan administration never questioned the legitimacy of the Lebanese 
government, and throughout American intervention in the country, they 
continued to cling to an illusion.
Nothing reflects this illusion better than National Security Decision 
Directive 64. Entitled "Next Steps In Lebanon" and signed by Reagan on October 
28, 1982, NSDD 64 outlined the "two principal objectives" of American
31 Colonel Patrick Collins quoted in Ibid., 102.
32 Hammel, 58.
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involvement in the multinational f o r c e .3 3  The first objective was "the prompt 
disengagement and quickest orderly withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian and Palestinian 
armed forces from L e b a n o n / ' 34  According to NSDD 64, this withdrawal could be 
achieved by the end of 1982. Reagan and his foreign policy advisors, in other 
words, believed that the Syrians, Israelis, and Palestinians would all volunteer to 
abandon their interests in Lebanon in only two months. The Syrians had been 
asked to intervene in the Lebanese Civil War in 1976, and they had stationed 
soldiers in Lebanon since that time. The expectation that they would disengage 
from Lebanon reflected an incredibly unrealistic assessment of the situation. 
Likewise, although the United States had a closer relationship with Israel, the 
Israelis expressed little interest in withdrawing from the country after having 
sacrificed so much during the June invasion.
The second objective delineated in NSDD 64 was the restoration of the 
Lebanese government. It committed the United States to strengthening the 
ability of the government to provide internal security, and it called for the 
rebuilding of the L A F .3 5  Like the first objective, the second downplayed the 
complexity of the Lebanese conflict. The officials responsible for NSDD 64 
seemed to think that the Israelis, Syrians, and Palestinians were the only obstacle 
to a sovereign and peaceful Lebanon. Yet there was also a seemingly endless list 
of internal factions that did not recognize the authority of the Gemayel 
government. In essence, both objectives revealed a profound ignorance of what
33 National Security Decision Directive 64,28 October 1982, Ronald Reagan 
Library, 1.
34  Ibid., 1.
35 Ibid., 1.
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was actually happening in Beirut at the time. Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat- 
Georgia) would later characterize American objectives in Lebanon as "mission 
impossible/' arguing that Reagan had placed the Marines in an "untenable 
military position.'^6 The Reagan administration wanted a stable Lebanese 
government, a powerful Lebanese army, and the removal of all foreign armies 
from the country. To accomplish these goals, Reagan sent 1,200 Marines to 
participate in a multinational force that included soldiers from France, Italy, and, 
eventually, Great Britain. This was truly an impossible mission. In the final 
paragraph of NSDD 64, there is a brief acknowledgement of the dangers 
associated with American intervention in Lebanon. However, since "our 
initiatives and our commitment to Lebanon's independence will further 
strengthen our credibility and demonstrate our determination to continue the 
progress we have already made," Reagan gave his approval for continued 
involvement.3 7 Interestingly, there is not a single reference to the Soviet Union 
in NSDD 64, which supports the argument that the threat of communism was 
something used to justify the mission after everything had gone terribly wrong.
The Marines, of course, were largely unaware of the policy decisions that 
led to their deployment. They arrived in Beirut on September 29, and they 
established their headquarters at Beirut International Airport. The Marines 
discovered that the area surrounding the airport was quite dangerous, since 
thousands of pieces of unexploded ordnance had accumulated from years of 
warfare. Before the Americans could move freely, mine-clearing teams were
36 NBC, Meet The Press, 23 October 1983.
37 NSDD 64,2.
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dispatched to remove the ordnance. On September 30, Corporal David Reagan, 
a military engineer directing a mine-clearance team, somehow touched off a 
cluster bomblet that had been manufactured in the United States and used by the 
Israelis during their invasion. The explosion sent pellets into his stomach and 
head. Despite attempts to revive him, David Reagan became the first American 
servicemen killed in L e b a n o n . 38 Reagan's death marked an ominous beginning 
to the second American intervention. Although the mission began with good 
intentions, it quickly became clear that administration officials had entangled 
themselves in a violent and chaotic environment that they did not fully 
comprehend.
In response to the first casualty in Lebanon, some politicians attempted to 
invoke the War Powers Act. Signed into law in November 1973 over Richard 
Nixon's veto, the act requires the President to provide official notification to 
Congress within 48 hours whenever American troops are committed to combat. 
If Congress does not approve the action, it mandates the withdrawal of all 
personnel within sixty days. Representative Clement J. Zablocki (Democrat- 
Wisconsin), for instance, compared American intervention in Lebanon to a 
person walking barefoot in a glass factory. Given the situation, he said, 
"[y]ou're bound to get c u t ."  39 Zablocki believed that further hostilities were 
almost a certainty, and he called on Reagan to give notification in the event of 
another incident. Senator Thomas F. Eagleton (Democrat-Missouri), one of the
38 Hammel, 41; William E. Farrell, "Marine Units Moving Cautiously Into Shell- 
Littered Areas of Beirut," The New York Times, 2 October 1982: Section 1, page 8.
39 David Shribman, "New Questions Arise Over War Act," The New York Times, 1 
October 1982: A8.
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co-authors of the War Powers Act, wrote a letter to Reagan in which he outlined 
the relevance of Section 4a. Since he anticipated that Lebanon was a place 
"where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances," Eagleton argued that Reagan was obligated by law to notify 
C o n g r e s s . 40  The Reagan administration denied the applicability of the War 
Powers Act, claiming that there was no expectation of Marine involvement in 
future hostilities. As the situation in Lebanon unfolded, however, these 
expectations would be shattered on more than one occasion. The Marines would 
indeed find themselves walking barefoot in a glass factory.
Yet the Marines in Beirut encountered little hostility from any faction until 
they had been there for almost six months. Since Americans did not become 
engaged in fighting, critics of Reagan's approach to the Lebanese crisis were 
essentially silenced. It appeared that the multinational force had helped to bring 
renewed stability to the region after the tragic events in September. In fact, 
many Muslims in Lebanon initially welcomed the presence of Americans. It 
seemed to them that the Americans had arrived to prevent future Israeli attacks 
on innocent civilians, and they viewed the Marines as a relatively neutral party. 
When the Marines went out on routine patrols, they frequently received warm 
greetings from the Lebanese people. An elderly Druze woman told John Benson 
Matthews that the Americans gave her a new sense of hope. "We are so tired of 
the killing," she allegedly said, "maybe it will all end now that you're here."41 
Horrified by the atrocities committed at Sabra and Shatila, the non-Christian
40 Senator Thomas F. Eagleton to President Ronald Reagan, 23 September 1982, 
Ronald Reagan Library (WHORM Subject File, CO086, Casefile 100743), 1.
41 Matthews, 142.
26
factions within Lebanon wanted protection from their enemies. They correctly 
believed that Marines came to Beirut as a result of the September massacres, but 
what they did not recognize at first was the close relationship between Amin 
Gemayel and the United States. Given the positive reception from the Lebanese, 
military leaders felt comfortable when asked to expand the patrols. Reagan 
authorized the Marines to extend their presence to heavily Christian East Beirut, 
and in the early part of November, they began to patrol the infamous Green 
Line, the boundary between East and West Beirut 42
When the administration came under fire in the aftermath of the barracks 
bombing, military officials would remind Congress about the warm welcome 
that they had received at the beginning of their mission. They pointed out that 
the Marines did not experience significant violence for several months. At some 
point in the future, historians will wonder whether this type of assessment was 
accurate or self-serving. Did the Marines really come into contact with 
supportive Muslim communities or were their recollections exaggerated to 
justify why they had been sent to Lebanon? In the absence of reliable sources, it 
is difficult to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. Nevertheless, it does 
appear that the Marines received support from factions that would eventually 
turn against them. On November 11, for example, Americans in the 
multinational force joined Lebanese Independence Day celebrations by running 
in a 10K road race through the streets of Beirut. They encountered no opposition 
along the way, and Matthews correctly observes that "[terrorists] could have
42 Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan To Expand Duties Of Marines Into East Beirut," 
The New York Times, 2 November 1982: A l.
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shot any num ber of them as they jogged the streets of Beirut, unarmed, and in 
their running shorts."43 Participation in a public event such as this would become 
unthinkable a year later, and while the absence of terrorist attacks in the early 
months of American intervention does not prove that none were considered, it 
certainly suggests that the Marines did experience a brief period of peace in 
Beirut.
The Marines were never neutral peacekeepers, but they did perform 
duties that are often associated with peacekeeping missions. At the end of 
February 1983, an unusually harsh winter storm descended on Lebanon. In 
conjunction with the Red Cross, the Marines conducted a relief mission to the 
desolate mountainous region east of Beirut, They traveled nineteen hours to the 
village of Qatarba where they found snow drifts that were sixteen feet high in 
certain spots. The Americans evacuated anyone in need of medical treatment, 
dug through the snow to look for survivors, and provided food and heating fuel 
to the v i l l a g e r s .  44 After completing the evacuations, the Marines returned to 
Beirut. The February rescue was one of the few tangible achievements of 
America's eighteen month involvement in the country. In freezing 
temperatures, the Marines had climbed treacherous mountain roads in order to 
save lives. Yet even in what was certainly their finest hour, the Marines 
participated in the mission at the request of the Lebanese government. It also 
should be noted that Qatarba has a predominantly Christian p o p u l a t i o n . 4 5  
Although the rescue operation was a humanitarian effort, it was far from neutral.
43 Matthews, 137.
44 Hammel, 68-71.
45 ibid., 69.
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In fact, one wonders whether the Gemayel government would have asked for 
assistance if the village had been a Muslim stronghold.
There are some Middle East experts who contend that the United States 
missed a an excellent opportunity between October and February to resolve the 
Lebanese crisis. According to Augustus Richard Norton, "October, November, 
and December 1982 were three critical months in which the future of Lebanon 
was to be fatefully s h a p e d . "  46 The window of opportunity thesis has been 
endorsed by many of Reagan's top foreign policy advisers. Geoffrey Kemp, a 
high ranking National Security Council official during the Reagan administration, 
adamantly believes that there could have been "a different outcome to the 
Lebanon tragedy if the United States responded in a different w a y . "  47 From the 
perspectives of both Norton and Kemp, the objectives enshrined in NSDD 64 
were achievable. The Syrians had been weakened by the Israeli invasion, and if 
the United States had only put more pressure on them, they would have left 
Lebanon. In essence, since America did not act quickly enough, the Soviet Union 
supplied the Syrians with new equipment, which made it less necessary for them 
to acquiesce to American demands. Norton and Kemp correctly observe that the 
Reagan administration could have done more to intervene diplomatically during 
the so-called window of opportunity. Yet even if the United States had acted 
differently in the final months of 1982, it is unlikely that Syria would have 
removed their troops from Lebanon without a major confrontation. The 
window of opportunity thesis also neglects the internal dynamics of the
46 Norton quoted in Matthews, 129.
47 Kemp quoted in Ibid., 129.
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Lebanese conflict. Like the authors of NSDD 64, Norton and Kemp gave much 
consideration to the presence of foreign countries in Lebanon, but they failed to 
adequately consider the multiple factions within the country that made peace 
close to impossible. Ironically, even in criticizing the foreign policy of the Reagan 
administration, these experts have been overly optimistic about the possibility of 
an alternative outcome to America's involvement in Lebanon.
In reality, the window of opportunity for success in Lebanon closed much 
earlier than Norton has suggested. When Reagan decided to deploy the second 
„ multinational force to Beirut in September 1982, he expected that the American 
presence would lead to peace. Yet his failure to assign realistic objectives to the 
mission put American lives in jeopardy. Between October and February, the 
Marines experienced almost no resistance from the warring factions in the 
region. But everything began to change during the month of March. The Italian 
contingent of the multinational force came under fire on March 15 when 
unidentified men fired rocket-propelled grenades at two Italian jeeps traveling in 
the vicinity of the Beirut International Airport. After Italian reinforcements 
arrived on the scene, the gunmen fired on them as well. Nine Italians were 
wounded in the incident, and at the time, reports indicated that two of the men 
had been paralyzed while another lost his right f o o t .  48  On the following day, 
five Americans on patrol in Beirut received minor shrapnel wounds after 
someone tossed a hand grenade at them. None of the Marines were seriously 
hurt, and they quickly returned to active d u t y .4 9
48 "5 U.S. Marines And 9 Italians Wounded In Lebanon/' The New York Times, 17 
March 1983: A ll.
49 Hammel, 74-75.
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Although it was unclear whether the attacks had been coordinated, all of 
the members of the multinational force recognized that the violence was an 
attempt to underm ine their mission. Colonel James Mead, the commander of 
the Marines in Lebanon, promised that "[w]e will not allow a single act of 
terrorism to stop us from our m ission/' and White House spokesperson Larry 
Speakes assured reporters that it was only an "isolated incident." 50 Subsequent 
events would reveal that Speakes had offered an inaccurate assessment of the 
situation. On March 17, the Italians returned fire in four different incidents. The 
next day two hand grenades were thrown at thirty French paratroopers in 
Chiyah, but no one was wounded in the a t t a c k  s i The four days of violence in 
March marked the conclusion to over five months of peace, and from that point 
to the withdrawal of American forces in 1984, it became abundantly clear that 
elements within Lebanon wanted the multinational force gone. The evidence 
obviously indicates that the Marines and their counterparts were being targeted. 
Despite the tragic turn of events in the middle of March, the Reagan 
administration did not re-consider its policy in Lebanon. The Marines were there 
as peacekeepers, and they would remain until Lebanon was stable. No one 
seemed to understand that the 1,200 Americans serving in the multinational force 
were at the center of an incredibly dangerous situation. From Reagan's vantage 
point, there was simply "no reverse gear" to American intervention in 
Lebanon.52
50 "5 U.S. Marines And 9 Italians Wounded In Lebanon," A ll.
51 "Italians Attacked Again In Beirut; Terror Campaign Feared By Some," The 
New York Times, IS March 1983: A6; Jonathan C. Randal, "French Unit in Lebanon 
Repels Grenade Attack," The Washington Post, 19 March 1983: A22.
52 Reagan quoted in Hammel, 75.
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The president of the United States, of course, always has the ability to 
reverse previous foreign policy decisions. Yet from the beginning of America's 
participation in the multinational force, Reagan made promises that severely 
limited his options in Lebanon. His lofty rhetoric committed the United States to 
a situation that would markedly deteriorate after the March attacks. On April 
18, 1983, a van loaded with explosives detonated in front of the American 
embassy in Beirut. Of the sixty-three people killed in the blast, seventeen were 
Americans. The explosion was particularly devastating for the Central 
Intelligence Agency, which lost both Kenneth Haas, the Beirut station chief, and 
Robert Ames, the agency's top Middle East e x p e r t .53  Many Americans in the 
embassy sustained serious injuries. Chief Warrant Officer Rayford Byers, who 
was helping to train the LAF, "lost his left eye, suffered head injuries which 
required two craniotomies, broke both collar bones, his left arm, and all his 
r i b s ." 5 4  Byers remained conscious despite the agonizing pain, and his screams 
eventually drew the attention of a Lebanese boy. Ambassador Robert Dillon 
found himself trapped under a piece of debris, but with the assistance of other 
embassy workers, he managed to escape from the building unscathed. In the 
days that followed, Consul Diane Dillar shuttled from the morgue and 
emergency room at American University Hospital to the embassy in order to 
determine who had been killed.55 For someone accustomed to the routine
53 Martin and Walcott, 109.
5 4  Ibid., 104; see also Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Beirut Embassy Bombed," The 
New York Times, 19 April 1983: Al.
55 State Department Situation Listing, American Embassy Beirut to Secretary of 
State, 28 June 1983, Ronald Reagan Library (White House Staff and Office Files: 
Executive Secretariat, NSC: Records: Cable Files), 2-3.
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bureaucratic work of an embassy, it must have been an incredibly difficult task.
The severity of the explosion was unprecedented, but it was not entirely 
unexpected. Shortly before the incident, the National Security Agency 
intercepted messages that suggested an attack on the multinational force was 
imminent. Unfortunately, the intercepts did not contain any specific information 
about the deadly plot.5^  When reports of the bombing reached Washington, the 
Reagan administration reacted with shock and outrage. At the beginning of his 
presidency, Reagan had assured all Americans that the United States would have 
no tolerance for international terrorism. "Let terrorists beware that when the 
rules of international behavior are violated," he proclaimed, "our policy will be 
one of swift and effective retribution." 57 Reagan made this declaration at a White 
House ceremony to celebrate the return of the Americans who had been held 
hostage in Iran for 444 days. After the embassy attack in April 1983, Reagan 
appeared ready to uphold his policy on terrorism. He told the families of the 
victims that the suicide bombing was an "act of unparalleled cowardice" that 
"was an attack on all of us, on our way of life and on the values we hold dear."58 
Rather than withdrawing from Lebanon, Reagan said that the United States had 
an obligation to remain in the country. "We would indeed fail them if we let that 
act deter us from carrying on their mission of brotherhood and peace," he 
warned.59
Surprisingly, Reagan did not retaliate against the terrorists responsible for
56 Martin and Walcott, 105.
57 Ibid., 43.
58 Reagan quoted in Cannon, 360.
59 Reagan quoted in Ibid., 360.
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the explosion. The National Security Agency had decoded intercepts linking the 
plot to the Iranian Foreign Ministry and the Iranian Embassy in Syria, but despite 
the quality of the evidence, which included a $25,000 money transfer from Iran to 
finance the operation, the Reagan administration did not execute its policy of 
swift and effective retribution.60 Instead of retaliating, Reagan renewed 
America's commitment to the faltering Gemayel government. The CIA did 
manage to track down four suspects in the case, and one of the agents involved 
in the interrogation was eventually fired for brutally beating confessions out of 
the prisoners. The information obtained from the suspects confirmed that the 
attack originated in Syria, but interestingly, it appears that most of the men who 
participated in the execution of the mission lived in Lebanon. In fact, the 
conspirators had even managed to recruit a Palestinian worker in the American 
Embassy to signal them when Ambassador Dillon was in the building.61 The 
involvement of Lebanese civilians in the attack contradicts the idea that it was 
entirely unrelated to United States foreign policy. While the evidence indicates 
that Iran and Syria were key participants, it also reveals that the success of the 
plot depended on local support. It remains unclear why these men decided to 
join the suicide mission, but they obviously did not consider the Americans in 
Beirut to be neutral peacekeepers.
If nothing else, the embassy bombing in April should have prompted 
Reagan and his advisers to re-consider American objectives in Lebanon. Reagan, 
of course, decided to keep the Marines in the country while continuing to hope
60 Martin and Walcott, 105.
61 Ibid., 105.
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for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. In the aftermath of the attack, historians 
know that the administration attempted to work harder to achieve this objective. 
Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 92 ("Accelerating the 
W ithdrawal of Foreign Forces from Lebanon") less than ten days after the 
incident 62 Unfortunately for researchers, NSDD 92 remains entirely classified at 
present. When this document is declassified, it will be possible to provide a more 
definitive assessment of what officials were considering in the spring of 1983. In 
a larger sense, however, it is abundantly clear that Reagan willfully ignored the 
dangers that confronted all of the Americans stationed in Lebanon at the time. It 
is difficult to understand why the Reagan administration did not do more to 
protect the multinational force given the vulnerabilities that became obvious on 
April 18. Yet according to General Vessey, the answer is actually quite simple; 
"[a]!though it was a great tragedy," he maintains, "it seemed like an inexplicable 
aberration."63 Six months later, when another suicide mission killed 241 
American servicemen, Reagan would realize how wrong they had been.
62 National Security Decision Directive 92,27 April 1983, Ronald Reagan Library, 
[note: the text of this directive remains classified].
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Chapter 2: The End of Innocence
Lebanon will, in my mind, always stand as a major reproach
to me because I was not more persuasive, in all the meetings
we held, to prevent the worst loss of military lives to occur 
during the time I was at the Pentagon.—Caspar Weinbergeri
In the month that followed the embassy bombing in April, Secretary of 
State George Shultz increased his efforts to resolve the ongoing Lebanese crisis. 
Shultz's negotiations helped to produce the peace treaty between Israel and 
Lebanon that was signed on May 17, 1983. Commonly known as the May 17
agreement, the document technically ended Israel's war against Lebanon. Both
nations agreed to respect the international border separating them, and the 
agreement established a security region in southern Lebanon. 2 The security 
zone, of course, was one of Israel's primary demands, since they wanted to 
prevent the resurgence of terrorist attacks against settlements in the north. 
According to the terms of the agreement, Israel pledged to completely withdraw 
their forces from Lebanon within three months. At the time, it appeared that 
Shultz had managed to achieve the impossible. Yet other administration officials 
were extremely skeptical of the May 17 agreement. "Why such an agreement 
was reported to us in such glowing terms by George Shultz has always remained 
a mystery to me," observed Weinberger in his memoirs.^ Skeptics in the 
administration knew something that the American public did not; in order to get 
Israel's approval, Shultz had arranged a secret side letter that essentially
1 Weinberger, 173.
2 Farida Abu Izzeddin Sarieddine, "Reagan's Foreign Policy: A Case Study of 
Lebanon, 1982-1984" (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1999), 221-222.
3 Weinberger, 155-156.
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undermined the entire peace agreement. The letter, which would later become 
public, said that Israel would only have to withdraw if there was a simultaneous 
evacuation of Syrian forces.4
Once again, the Reagan administration revealed that it did not understand 
the complexity of the relationship between Lebanon, Israel, and Syria. According 
to George Ball's astute analysis of the May 17 agreement, "[h]ow any American 
government could have so wildly misread the reactions of Damascus will no 
doubt puzzle future historians/'s It is indeed confusing to understand why Shultz 
described the agreement so optimistically, especially since he was fully aware of 
the side letter. Shultz, like many of Reagan's advisers, has blamed the failure of 
the peace accords on the Soviet Union and Syria, who supposedly "were 
determined to see that the region remained a tense and dangerous place." 6 By 
accusing the Syrians of prolonging the crisis in Lebanon, he gave the impression 
that they had been involved in the negotiations and then backed out afterwards. 
In reality, the only parties bound by the May 17 agreement were Lebanon and 
Israel. Ball has convincingly argued that Shultz would have been more successful 
if he had included Syrian representatives. From his perspective, "[a] less obtuse 
American diplomacy would have recognized Syria's security concerns and 
predicted that, if Israel were offered a security zone, the Syrians would inevitably 
insist on a comparable zone of their own."7 Syria, in other words, believed that 
their interests in Lebanon had been ignored. They had been invited to Lebanon
4 Ball, 66.
5 Ibid., 68.
6 Shultz, 220.
7 Ball, 69.
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rather than invading it, but unlike Israel, they were not receiving any incentive to 
leave.
In essence, the Reagan administration continued to defend Israeli 
demands. Shultz could have done more to force the withdrawal of the IDF from 
Lebanon, but his acceptance of the secret side letter made the May 17 agreement 
irrelevant from the moment it was signed. Rather than bringing stability to 
Lebanon, the treaty actually contributed to an increasing level of domestic 
turmoil. Amin Gemayel soon realized that he had acquired many enemies by 
supporting the peace accords. The political factions that opposed Gemayel's rule 
discovered that the agreement provided them with a sense of unity, and in July, 
a coalition called the National Salvation Front was formed to prevent the 
implementation of the treaty. The National Salvation Front exposed the 
relationship between the United States and the Lebanese government. Not 
surprisingly, opponents of Gemayel viewed the Marines as an army of 
occupation; Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze, made this point abundantly 
clear while visiting Syria: "The mere fact that they [the Marines] are providing 
the Lebanese factional army with logistic support, expertise, and training is 
enough for us to consider them enemies."8
Prior to the May 17 agreement, opposition to the multinational force 
certainly existed. The Marines had been attacked in March, and at the beginning 
of May, someone on the ground fired a missile at an American helicopter. When 
news of the negotiations reached Lebanon, however, hostility to the United 
States became even more widespread, since the treaty seemed to reward Israel
8 Jumblatt quoted in Sarieddine, 210.
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for the 1982 invasion. Opposition leaders finally grasped that the United States 
was taking sides with the Gemayel government. The Reagan administration 
worked hard to prevent Gemayel from backing away from the agreement, but 
in order to mollify the opposition, he later decided to oppose i t 9
In retrospect, when the failure of the May 17 agreement became apparent 
to his administration, Reagan should have ordered the Marines to withdraw. 
The twin objectives of American policy in Lebanon—internal stability and the 
complete withdrawal of foreign armies—remained entirely out of reach despite 
months of negotiations from Shultz. Both Syria and Israel remained in Lebanon,
. and the political situation in Beirut was actually getting worse. The 
administration had hoped that the American contingent of the multinational 
force would help to achieve the objectives of the United States. During the 
congressional hearings that followed the barracks attack, military officials 
explained that their mission in Beirut was to establish an American presence that 
would facilitate diplomatic efforts. One member of the Committee On Armed 
Services jokingly remarked that the position of the Marines was analogous to a 
bouncer in a night club who does not have the authority to remove unruly 
patrons.10 When seen in this light, the entire concept of presence seemed 
somewhat ridiculous. In fairness, though, some administration officials did 
recommend the withdrawal of the Marines prior to October 23. Realizing that 
the multinational force could not help the United States attain their objectives,
9 Ball, 70.
10 Review of Adequacy of Security Arrangements for Marines in Lebanon and Plans for 
Improving that Security, Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Services And The 
Investigations Subcommittee Of The Committee On Armed Services, House Of 
Representatives (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 48.
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Weinberger believed that it was time to end the mission. "Because we could not 
achieve the objectives for which we had entered/' Weinberger has explained, "I 
urged repeatedly that we should dissolve the MNF and leave." n
Despite the recommendations of Weinberger, however, the Marines 
remained at Beirut International Airport. Factions within Lebanon continued to 
target the multinational force during the summer of 1983. It became normal for 
the Marines to receive sniper fire, and at the end of July, two Americans were 
wounded. According to the rules of engagement enacted for the mission, the 
Marines could only fire in self-defense. The Americans frequently saw armed 
m en walking near their fortifications at the airport. Since they understood that 
the Marines were completely helpless, the militiamen sometimes taunted them. 
They entertained themselves by pointing at the Americans and yelling, '"bang, 
bang." 12 The Marines, unable to shoot back in these situations, could only 
respond with their middle fingers.
All of the joking ended on August 28, 1983 when the Marines were 
granted permission to return fire for the first time since they had been sent to 
B e i r u t .  13 On the following day, the Americans came under intense mortar fire 
along the perimeter of the airport. One of the rounds hit the tent that housed the 
command of the 1st Platoon, wounding several men and killing both Staff 
Sergeant Alexander Ortega and Second Lieutenant George Losey.14 Prior to 
August 29, the attacks on the multinational force had been mostly sporadic. The
11 Weinberger, 158.
12 Hammel, 123.
13 Cannon, 366.
i4Richard Bernstein, "2 Marines Killed In Lebanon And 14 Others Are Wounded 
As Beirut Fighting Spreads," The New York Times, 30 August 1983: A l; Hammel, 125-135.
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shelling that killed Ortega and Losey was unprecedented; based on the available 
descriptions of the incident, it seems apparent that the Marines were the intended 
targets of the m ortar fire. Some officials suggested that the summer violence 
had little connection to the American mission in Lebanon. They gave the 
impression that the Marines simply had been caught in the cross-fire. In the 
opinion of General Paul X. Kelley, the Commandant of the Marines, "[wjhoever 
is shooting at us . . .  is shooting more at where we are than who we are. There is 
no indication anybody is purposefully taking [M]arines under fire."is This 
assessment is inaccurate to say the least, and it is also should be noted that the 
first American combat deaths in Beirut occurred on the day after the Marines 
returned fire. Although it is impossible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the two events were connected, basic common sense certainly suggests that the 
decision to return fire on August 28 directly contributed to the deadly attack on 
the next day.
The violence in August convinced the Marine commanders in Beirut that 
they needed to move their men to a safer location. Tragically, the building that 
they selected would be the one destroyed by a suicide bomber in October, but at 
the time, the sturdy concrete structure provided the Marines with protection 
against snipers and mortar f i r e . 16 Within a week after the deaths of Ortega and 
Losey, Israel withdrew from the Shuf, a mountainous region overlooking Beirut, 
and moved south to the Awali River. The withdrawal of the Israelis led to the 
deterioration of an already chaotic situation. With the LAF and the Druze militia
15 Kelley quoted in Ball, 74.
Weinberger, 157.
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clashing in the Shuf, the Marines continued to occupy the low ground around the 
airport. This became an increasingly hazardous position, and two Marines were 
killed on September 6.17 Four days later, President Reagan issued National 
Security Decision Directive 103 ("Strategy For Lebanon"). NSDD 103 re-iterated 
the two objectives outlined in NSDD 64, which implied that the mission in 
Lebanon had not changed since the initial deployment of American forces. In 
reality, though, NSDD 103 significantly altered American objectives in the region. 
It concluded that "material and training assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces 
should be accelerated and expanded as feasible," and more importantly, it called 
for the "aggressive self-defense against hostile or provocative acts from any 
quarter."!8
Three sections on the second page of NSDD 103 remain classified, and 
when these are opened to the public, researchers will have a more complete 
understanding of American strategy in September 1983. Nevertheless, 
aggressive self-defense is undoubtedly the key phrase in NSDD 103. How 
aggressive self-defense differed from regular self-defense was never clarified, 
and the authors of the directive remained committed to the idea that the Marines 
were acting as peacekeepers. "Our actions in this regard should demonstrate our 
impartiality in the confessional conflict," the document stated. 19 Yet the 
multinational force had been working in conjunction with the LAF since their 
arrival a year earlier. During the first year of American intervention in Lebanon,
17 Ball, 74.
is National Security Decision Directive 103,10 September 1983, Ronald Reagan 
Library, 1.
19 Ibid., 1.
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the United States had provided training, weapons, and logistical support to the 
soldiers loyal to Amin Gemayel. On Sunday, September 11, the Reagan 
administration took the relationship between Gemayel and the United States 
government to the next level. The intense fighting in the Shuf on the previous 
day between the Druze and LAF raised the possibility that the Lebanese 
government might lose the strategic village of Suq-al-Gharb, and if this 
happened, hostile factions would be within striking distance of East Beirut.
Robert McFarlane, the successor to Philip Habib as Middle Eastern special 
envoy, conferred with advisers to discuss the latest developments in Beirut. As 
journalists David C. Martin and John Walcott have explained, McFarlane 
proceeded to send a flash cable from Lebanon to Washington that they describe 
as "the most dramatic document in the sad history of the American involvement 
in Lebanon/'20 Reagan's top foreign policy advisers would later refer to 
McFarlane's message as the sky is falling cable. The opening sentences of the 
cable reflect a sense of urgency and panic: "There is a serious threat of a decisive 
military defeat which could involve the fall of the Government of Lebanon 
within twenty-four hours. Last night's battle was waged within five kilometers 
of the Presidential Palace. For those at the State Department, this would 
correlate to the enemy attacking from Capitol H i l l ."  21 McFarlane made specific 
reference to NSDD 103, arguing that the fall of Suq-al-Gharb would put the 
multinational force in the line of fire. As a consequence, he called on Washington 
to assist the LAF with fire support. Oddly enough, he reasoned that such a
20 Martin and Walcott, 119.
21 Ibid., 119.
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display of force would be defensive action. According to McFarlane's assessment 
of the situation, "we must recognize that to wait until an attack tonight is at our 
doorstep before responding would be too late. "22
McFarlane later explained that he considered September 11 to be "the 
moment of tru th  for our entire Lebanese s t r a t e g y . " 2 3  I f  the LAF lost control of 
Suq-al-Gharb, he believed that the Gemayel government would be overthrown. 
In fairness to McFarlane, he correctly perceived that the level of violence was 
escalating. The American ambassador's residence in Beirut had been hit with 
shrapnel during the fighting, and intelligence reports from the field indicated that 
a Lebanese commander had been hacked to death with an axe. After sending the 
cable to Washington, McFarlane called National Security Adviser William Clark. 
He told Clark that the "basic strategy" of the United States government was at 
stake, reminding him "that Americans are also under fire and the existing rules 
of engagement provide authority for returning fire if you're being fired u p o n . " 24  
Although McFarlane had good reason to be concerned about the outbreak of 
hostilities in the Shuf, he did not adequately question the information that he 
received from the Lebanese government. He observed in his cable that the 
attack on Suq-al-Gharb was "unambiguously f o r e i g n . "  25 Given this analysis of 
the situation, it appears that McFarlane accepted the intelligence sources that 
linked the violence to Syrian officers and Palestinian soldiers. It is possible that 
foreign forces participated in the fighting outside of Beirut, but it is also clear that
22 Ibid., 120.
23 Robert C. McFarlane (with Zofia Smardz), Special Trust (New York: Cadell & 
Davies, 1994), 250.
24 Ibid., 251.
25 Martin and Walcott, 119.
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the Druze militia, one of the many factions within Lebanon that opposed 
Gemayel, had a central role in the conflict. Therefore, McFarlane's description of 
the situation was misleading; there was a considerable amount of ambiguity that 
McFarlane either did not understand or ignored.
In retrospect, September 11 was not the moment of truth for American 
involvement in Lebanon. Yet McFarlane's cable and his subsequent phone call to 
Clark persuaded officials in Washington to write an addendum to NSDD 103. 
Signed by President Reagan on September 11, the addendum  echoed the 
concerns that McFarlane had expressed earlier that day: "It has been determined 
that occupation of the dominant terrain in the vicinity of SUQ-AL-GHARB by 
hostile forces will endanger Marine positions."26 The modification to NSDD 103 
authorized the use of naval fire and air strikes to help the LAF defend Suq-al- 
Gharb. In addition to barring the use of ground forces, the addendum  gave the 
American commander in Beirut the authority to determine when the village wras 
in jeopardy of falling to the enemy.27 Interestingly, despite McFarlane's 
predictions, the LAF retained control of Suq-al-Gharb without American 
assistance. A week later, however, Colonel Timothy Geraghty, the commander 
of the Marines in Lebanon, received an order to fire on Suq-al-Gharb. According 
to two officers who overheard Geraghty speaking with his superiors on the 
phone, he attempted to protest the order: "Do you realize if you do that, we'll 
get slaughtered down here? We could be severely attacked. We're totally 
vulnerable. We're sitting ducks."28 in  the end, Geraghty obeyed the command,
26 Addendum  to NSDD 103,11 September 1983, Ronald Reagan Library, 1.
27 ibid., 1.
28 Geraghty quoted in Wright, 78.
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and on September 19, the navy opened fire on the LAF's opposition. The USS 
Virginia, a navy cruiser, and three other ships participated in the a t t a c k .2 9
Eighteen days later, Colonel Thomas Fintel, who was responsible for 
training the LAF, concluded that the Lebanese most likely could have held onto 
Suq-al-Gharb even if the United States had not intervened. Moreover, previous 
reports suggested that the LAF had sustained heavy casualties while fighting to 
defend the village, but in reality, less than ten Lebanese soldiers had been 
k i l l e d . 30  To put it simply, McFarlane's cable was wildly inaccurate. He claimed 
that the fall of one location would lead to the collapse of the Lebanese 
government, and he also gave the impression that the Syrians were determined 
to take over Lebanon. In fact, after the USS Virginia shelled the enemies of the 
LAF, McFarlane visited the battle site in order to evaluate what happened. In 
describing this visit in his memoirs, McFarlane compared the victory at Suq-al- 
Gharb to the Tet offensive in Vietnam. "Just as the North Vietnamese had 
decided to challenge the Americans and the local national government and 
failed," he said, "so, too, had Syrian-backed elements tried and failed [in 
Lebanon]."31 McFarlane clung to the illusion that the entire Lebanese crisis was 
inextricably connected to Syria. If the United States could get the Syrians out of 
Lebanon, he believed, the Gemayel government would be stabilized. His 
reasoning epitomized the style of decisionmaking that led Lyndon Johnson to 
escalate the war in Vietnam; with American determination and military power, it 
would be possible to create a nation in the image of the United States.
29 McFarlane, 251.
30 Wright, 78.
31 McFarlane, 252.
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Unfortunately, as Johnson learned during Vietnam, American 
intervention-even the commitment of over 500,000 soldiers—does not guarantee 
success. Yet Robert McFarlane never learned the lessons of Vietnam. Rather 
than focusing on negotiations to achieve American objectives in Lebanon, he 
thought that military supremacy would suffice. McFarlane even attempted to 
intimidate President Hafez al-Assad of Syria by mentioning that Reagan had 
ordered the deployment of the USS New Jersey, the navy's only battleship, to the 
Lebanese s h o r e .  32  When Assad reacted indifferently to the news, McFarlane did 
not know how to respond. McFarlane's strategy clearly "showed a lamentable 
naivete" that made Assad much more resistant to withdrawing his soldiers from 
the c o u n t r y .33 In retrospect, the Reagan administration should have made 
genuine concessions to Assad. Given the intimidation tactics that McFarlane 
used, it is not surprising why Syria became increasingly distrustful of the United 
States during the Reagan presidency. Having failed to win concessions from 
Assad, McFarlane became so desperate that he contacted his pastor to pray for 
peace in L e b a n o n .  34  The United States truly needed a miracle in the fall of 1983, 
but divine intervention never arrived.
The violent turn of events between August and September drew the 
attention of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. At the end of 
August, Senator Robert Byrd (Democrat-West Virginia) wrote a letter to Reagan 
in which he demanded acknowledgement of the War Powers Act and "a
32 Ibid., 253.
33 Ball, 80.
34 McFarlane, 253.
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reassessment of the situation" in Lebanon.^5 He reminded Reagan that the 
Marines had been committed with the expectation of a relatively short mission, 
and he emphasized the importance of having clearly defined objectives. 
Representative Henry B. Gonzalez (Democrat-Texas) also requested Reagan to 
re-consider America's presence in the conflict, since both Syria and Israel 
appeared intransigent. "In these conditions," wrote Gonzalez, "it is not only 
prudent, but absolutely necessary, to ask w hat the further risk of our young men 
can accomplish, what our interests are, and whether or not changefs] in policy 
are w a r r a n t e d ." 3 6  For the first time since it had been passed in 1973, Congress 
invoked the War Powers Act. Opponents of Reagan's policy correctly believed 
that the Marines were now involved in combat, and as a consequence, they 
dem anded that Reagan officially notify both houses of Congress under the 
provisions of the act.
The debate that ensued within Congress would eventually produce a 
compromise on September 29. The legislation permitted the extension of the 
mission for another eighteen months, but in return, the Reagan administration 
agreed to accept the applicability of the War Powers Act. In the Senate, while 
only two Democrats voted in favor of the bill, all but three Republicans gave 
their support to the Reagan administration. Senator Dan Quayle, a Republican 
from Indiana, explained that the legislation was designed to give Reagan and his 
advisers "breathing room," but he also observed that the Senate vote was not
35 Senator Robert C. Byrd to President Ronald Reagan, 31 August 1983, Ronald 
Reagan Library, (WHORM Subject File, CO086, Casefile 161289), 1.
36 Representative Henry B. Gonzalez to President Ronald Reagan, 2 September 
1983, Ronald Reagan Library (WHORM Subject File, CO086, Casefile 161467), 2.
48
the equivalent of a blank check: "I would hope he knows that there's not a true, 
genuine support for his policies in C o n g r e s s . "  37  Senate Democrats argued that 
Reagan had placed Americans in a dangerous position that would only get 
worse. "Some say that Lebanon is not Vietnam/' said Senator Edward Kennedy 
(Democrat-Massachusetts); "But I reply, we must not give the President the 
power to turn it into o n e . " 3 8  However, since the Democrats did not hold the 
majority in the Senate, they could not block the measure.
The opponents of Reagan's policy in Lebanon missed the opportunity to 
m ount a strong resistance in the House of Representatives where the Democrats 
were the majority party. House Speaker Tip O'Neill orchestrated the deal with 
the White House over the War Powers Act, and his political maneuvering 
persuaded 130 Democrats to vote for the legislation. O'Neill's decision to 
support the administration revealed a profound ignorance of American foreign 
policy. At the beginning of September, he had been invited to a meeting with 
Robert McFarlane. McFarlane, of course, told O'Neill that the Syrians and Israelis 
would soon withdraw from Lebanon and that the Lebanese government had 
promised to reform the cabinet. "Put that way," O'Neill recalled, "the presence 
of the [Mjarines made sense. But at the time, nobody mentioned that their real 
mission [sic] was to protect the highly exposed Beirut a ir p o r t ." 3 9  Given his 
position of power, O'Neill had the responsibility to critically evaluate the 
information that he received from McFarlane. Anyone familiar with the
37 Steven V. Roberts, "Congress Agrees To Allow Marines To Stay In Beirut,"
The New York Times, 30 September 1983: A l, A8.
38 Ibid., Al.
39 Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (with William Novak), Man of the House: The Life and 
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Lebanese situation would have told him that the withdrawal of foreign forces 
was not imminent. Yet O'Neill never sought the advice of an unbiased State 
Department analyst, and as a result, he became the paw n of the Reagan 
administration. According to John Aloysius Farrell, "the White House had 
skillfully manipulated the Speaker—getting him to endorse an unpopular and 
unwise exercise in Lebanon . . .  [and then using] him for cover when it went sour 
." 4 0
Not only did O'Neill arrange the eighteen month extension, he delivered a 
poignant speech in which he implored fellow Democrats to support the Marines 
stationed in Lebanon. He assured his colleagues that Reagan was deeply 
concerned with the safety of the American contingent of the multinational force, 
and representatives claimed that the speech changed several v o t e s .  41 In essence, 
O'Neill turned Lebanon into a political bargaining chip; although he was 
obviously a consummate politician when it came to domestic issues, he simply 
did not understand the value of statesmanship. Frustrated w ith Reagan's victory 
in Congress, Senator Robert Byrd nicely summarized the fundamental problem 
of the legislation: "Politics is the art of compromise. War is n o t ." 4 2  Several 
months later, when O'Neill turned against American involvement in Lebanon, 
Reagan accused him of being unpatriotic. Outraged by the comment, O'Neill 
went on the offensive. "The deaths [of the Marines] lie on him [Reagan] and the 
defeat in Lebanon lies on him and him alone," he d e c l a r e d . 4 3  Although O'Neill
40 John Aloysius Farrell, Tip O'Neill and the Democratic Century (New York: Little, 
Brown and Company, 2001), 619.
41 Ibid., 615.
42 Roberts, A8.
43 O'Neill quoted in Farrell, 619.
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had every right to feel betrayed, someone with his political experience should 
have known better. He had the opportunity to pressure Reagan to end 
American intervention in Lebanon, but he failed to take advantage of the 
situation in September. In fairness, even if O'Neill managed to force Reagan to 
pull out the Marines, it is unlikely that the withdrawal would have been executed 
before the barracks bombing on October 23. At the same time, however, O'Neill 
shares at least some of the blame for what was one of the worst debacles in the 
history of American foreign relations.
During the time between the Congressional compromise and the attack on 
the Marines in Beirut, the situation on the ground remained unstable despite the 
successful intervention at Suq-al-Gharb. American helicopters came under fire at 
the beginning of October, and the following week two Marines were killed in 
separate incidents. The multinational force repeatedly returned fire against 
enemy snipers who were targeting them from buildings in the vicinity of the 
airport. Even Reagan's supporters began to recognize that the American deaths 
were not accidental. At this point, the existing divisions within the cabinet 
hardened. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who had opposed the 
Lebanon venture from the beginning, clashed with McFarlane and Secretary of 
State George Shultz. Although Shultz and McFarlane believed that withdrawal 
from Lebanon would undermine the credibility of the United States in the Middle 
East, Weinberger saw it differently. On October 18, 1983, Weinberger informed 
President Reagan at a meeting of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG)
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that the Pentagon recommended the removal of the Marines from the airport.44 
Weinberger developed an extensive argument to support the military's 
recommendation. He argued that the position in Beirut was indefensible; that 
the CIA had credible information to suggest the possibility of terrorist attacks on 
the multinational force; that the last vestiges of neutrality had been destroyed 
when the navy fired to support the LAF; and that American casualties were on 
the rise 45 After Weinberger finished, journalist Patrick Sloyan has explained that 
the NSPG took a short break. Weinberger apparently removed his 
recommendation from the agenda before the meeting re-convened. It remains 
unclear why Weinberger did this, and it also should be noted that the Reagan 
administration refuted Sloyan's account when it first appeared in 1984.
Future historians will want to closely examine what happened at the NSPG 
meeting on October 18. If Weinberger presented the Pentagon recommendation 
with such forcefulness, in other words, why did he withdraw it during the break? 
As more documents are de-classified, it will become possible to provide a much 
better explanation for his actions. Assuming that Sloyan's version of events is 
accurate, Reagan never actually rejected the military's request to withdraw the 
Marines from Lebanon. Once again, Reagan avoided making a decision that 
would have created conflict in his cabinet. A more decisive president would have 
acted differently. "Had Reagan given the order that day," Sloyan has claimed, 
"the troops could have been evacuated within twenty-four hours, Marine Corps
44 Patrick J. Sloyan, "The Warnings Reagan Ignored," The Nation, 27 October 
1984: 410.
45 Ibid., 410.
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officers estimated at the tim e/'46 This piece of information is somewhat 
misleading, since it appears that the Marine estimate was geared towards a 
worst-case scenario. If Reagan had decided to withdraw the Americans in the 
multinational force, it almost certainly would have been a gradual evacuation. 
As a consequence, the implication that the barracks bombing could have been 
averted at the NSPG meeting on October 18 is unfounded. Yet one wonders 
why administration officials did not request the tightening of security in Beirut 
given CIA reports of a potential terrorist attack.
On the day after the meeting, a Marine convoy in Beirut became the target 
of an unsuccessful ambush. The failed attack confirmed the reliability of CIA 
sources in the region, and less than a week later, a suicide bomber destroyed the 
Marine headquarters at the Beirut International Airport, killing 241 Americans. 
McFarlane, who had been recently appointed National Security Adviser, notified 
Reagan of the attack at around 2:30 AM. Reagan and his wife returned to 
Washington from their vacation at Augusta National Golf Course four hours 
later.47 The National Security Council convened for an emergency meeting in the 
White House Situation Room, and as the day progressed, the casualty reports 
arriving from Beirut only got worse.
Speaking from the Roosevelt Room on the morning of October 23, 
Weinberger said that the United States had evidence linking the bombing to Iran 
and even suggested that the Soviet Union was a potential suspect. Interestingly, 
Weinberger told television viewers that America could not "simply walk away"
46 Ibid., 410.
47 Reagan, 453.
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from Lebanon, since the country was "absolutely vital to our national in te re s t/^  
The anger of the administration was understandable given the circumstances, but 
the declarations of Weinberger and other officials were reckless and misleading. 
Weinberger never really believed that Lebanon had any strategic value, but in 
that interview, he unveiled the strategy that the White House would use to 
justify American involvement in Lebanon in the aftermath of the bombing. To 
be sure, some people in the White House—most notably McFarlane and the 
president himself—sincerely interpreted the Lebanese crisis as an outgrowth of 
the Cold War. Yet for the most part, the administration used the Soviet Union to 
deflect criticism. The United States had intervened in  Lebanon for political 
reasons that were only remotely related to the Cold War, but when everything 
began to fall apart and public support evaporated, officials suddenly gave the 
impression that the collapse of Lebanon would lead to Soviet domination of the 
Middle East.
Reagan promised the nation in a televised address that his administration 
would seek retribution for the attack. "Those who directed this atrocity must be 
dealt justice, and they will be," he d e c l a r e d  49 Other officials within the 
administration made similar comments, and the FBI immediately launched an 
investigation into the barracks bombing. Although Reagan appeared ready to 
execute his policy of swift and effective retribution against those responsible for 
the deaths of 241 Americans, he never followed through on his promises. FBI 
investigators concluded that the explosion was the result of thorough planning,
48 CBS, Face The Nation, 23 October 1983.
49 Reagan quoted in Wright, 72.
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but the limited amount of evidence uncovered made it difficult to retaliate 
effectively. Islamic Jihad, a relatively unknown terrorist organization at the time, 
claimed responsibility for the incident. In a phone call to a French news agency 
in Beirut, an anonymous man announced that the members of the group were 
"the soldiers of God . . . .  We are neither Iranians, Syrians nor Palestinians, but 
Muslims who follow the precepts of the K o r a n ."  50  Terrorist experts soon 
discovered that Islamic Jihad's success came from its invisibility, and on more 
than one occasion, the organization would cripple American policy in the Middle 
East.
Despite the clandestine nature of the organization who claimed 
responsibility for the attack, American intelligence indicated that they operated 
terrorist training camps in the Bekaa Valley. In his memoirs, Reagan explained 
that he decided not to retaliate because the intelligence information lacked 
credibility: "Our intelligence experts found it difficult to establish conclusively 
who was responsible for the attack on the barracks. Although several air strikes 
were planned against possible culprits, I canceled them because our experts said 
they were not absolutely sure they were the right targets. I d idn 't want to kill 
innocent people."5i Although such an explanation is obviously self-serving, 
Reagan's account is certainly plausible enough. Yet three years later, in April 
1986, Reagan ordered an attack on Libya that resulted in civilian c a s u a l t i e s .52 Not 
surprisingly, some sources have questioned the validity of Reagan's explanation.
50 Ibid., 73.
51 Reagan, 463-464.
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Journalist Philip Taubman, for instance, published an article in The New York Times 
Magazine in which he asserted that the United States initially planned on joining 
the French in an air strike. In the article, which appeared in 1985, Taubman 
claimed that American involvement in the mission "was aborted because the 
final go-ahead order was not issued in time by the Defense Department."53 
Taubman's findings suggested that Weinberger, not Reagan, blocked the plans 
for American retribution.
McFarlane has even argued that Weinberger violated a direct order from 
Reagan to retaliate. After discovering what had happened, he immediately told 
the president about Weinberger's insubordination, Reagan expressed 
disappointment after hearing the news. "We should have blown ihe daylights 
out of them," he allegedly said, "I just don 't understand."54 Weinberger, of 
course, vehemently denies McFarlane's story, and although he admits that he 
received a phone call from the French Minister of Defense on November 16, 
informing him of an impending retaliatory strike, he claims that Reagan had 
never issued an order for American participation in the mission. According to 
Weinberger, "[t]his is another instance when McFarlane's 'recollections,' well 
known to be 'flexible,' differed sharply from those of other . . .  participants."55
It remains unclear why the United States did not join the French in an air 
strike, and unfortunately, the military documents that could possibly provide an
53 Philip Taubman, "The Shultz-Weinberger Feud," The New York Times Magazine, 
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explanation are, of course, still classified. Although it seems unlikely that 
Weinberger violated a presidential order, it has been argued that Reagan did 
approve an attack on the Sheik Abdullah Barracks during a National Security 
Council meeting on November 14.56 The heated debate between McFarlane and 
Weinberger will undoubtedly continue until more sources become available. Yet 
based on the current evidence, the failure to retaliate reflected Reagan's inability 
to make important decisions. McFarlane has suggested that the president's poor 
decisionmaking "was destructive to our Middle East policy, and damaging to 
other foreign policy initiatives as well."57 It would be hard for anyone to 
disagree with McFarlane's conclusions, and as David C. Martin and John Walcott 
have noted in their analysis of American intervention in Lebanon, "[i]t was no 
wonder that the staff of the National Security Council later concluded that the 
best way to serve Reagan was to do his job for him."58
At the beginning of December, an American F-14 on a routine 
reconnaissance mission over Lebanon came under anti-aircraft fire. Although 
the plane made it back to the USS Kennedy, one of the carriers stationed on the 
Lebanese shore, Reagan decided to approve a tactical air strike against Syrian 
anti-aircraft positions. The strike on December 4 ended in disaster when surface- 
to-air missiles brought down two planes. One of the pilots had been killed, and 
Lieutenant Robert Goodman became the prisoner of Syrian s o l d i e r s . 5 9  
Fortunately for the Reagan administration, Jesse Jackson helped to arrange the
56 Martin and Walcott, 138.
57 McFarlane, 271.
58 Martin and Walcott, 139.
59  Ibid., 140-144.
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safe return of Goodman. Overall, the air strike had accomplished almost 
nothing. The pilots managed to damage some of their targets, but within a few 
days, the anti-aircraft sites had been successfully repaired. General Vessey, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the mission as "a Chinese fire 
drill . . ."60 Once again, Reagan selected a course of action that undermined 
American objectives in the Middle East. His administration mistakenly believed 
that they could intimidate Syria with their sophisticated weapons of war, and in 
the end, this strategy backfired.
Even after the destruction of the Marine barracks, Reagan and his advisers 
- remained committed to the objectives in NSDD 64. On October 2 8 ,  1 9 8 3 ,  five 
. .days after the suicide attack, Reagan signed NSDD 1 1 1 . Much of the document is 
still classified, but the sections of it open to the public are quite revealing. On the 
second page, Reagan called for the re-assertion of American leadership in the 
Middle East "by acting once more in a bold way, especially in the aftermath of 
the Beirut tragedies."6* More importantly, the president authorized the extension 
of the rules of engagement on the following page: "The changes [in the ROE] 
should allow support to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), such as that currently 
authorized for Suq al-Gharb, when in the judgment of the U.S. ground 
commander, LAF positions controlling strategic arteries to Beirut are in danger 
of being overrun by hostile f o r c e s . "  62 In essence, NSDD 1 1 1  expanded the scope 
of the addendum  to NSDD 1 0 3 ,  which had been approved by the president on
60 Vessey quoted in Ibid., 144.
61 National Security Decision Directive 111, 28 October 1983, Ronald Reagan 
Library, 2.
62 Ibid., 3.
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September 11. The Marine commander in Beirut could now authorize air and 
naval strikes in order to assist the LAF in their attempt to hold the high ground 
on the outskirts of the city. By providing fire support to the LAF, the United 
States government was clearly pursuing an offensive strategy. Amazingly, the 
administration still claimed that the Americans in the multinational force were 
neutral peacekeepers in the conflict. NSDD 117, for instance, further outlined "a 
policy of vigorous self-defense" that sought to minimize collateral damage. 63 
When the Americans could not retaliate against those responsible for initiating 
hostile fire without putting civilians lives at risk, NSDD 117 made it permissible to 
fire on "discrete military targets in unpopulated areas which are organizationally 
associated with the firing units."64
In theory, NSDD 117 sounded reasonable enough, but in practice, it 
contributed to some of the most reckless attacks on innocent civilians since the 
Vietnam War. With its sixteen inch guns, the USS New Jersey was probably the 
most powerful non-nuclear weapon in the American arsenal at the time. It could 
fire a 2,700 pound shell several miles, and a single shell had the ability to 
obliterate an area the size of a square mile. Although the New Jersey reached the 
coast of Lebanon at the end of September, its powerful guns remained silent 
during October and November. On December 14, however, the ship unleashed 
eleven 1,900 pound shells at targets on the ridgeline overlooking Beirut.6 5 
Despite the immense power of the New Jersey, the ship's commander did not
63 National Security Decision Directive 117, 5 December 1983, Ronald Reagan 
Library, 1.
64 Ibid., 1.
65 Fred Hiatt, "Use of 16-Inch Guns Authorized On Dec. 3; U.S. Commander Had 
Been Restricted," The Washington Post, 15 December 1983: A40.
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have the information that was necessary to fire the guns accurately. The navy 
would normally rely on field reporting when positioning their weapons, but 
given the widespread violence on the ground, reconnaissance teams were not 
dispatched. To make matters even worse, the ammunition used for the sixteen 
inch guns was at least thirty years old, which further reduced the accuracy and 
effectiveness of the shelling.66
The longer the Marines remained in Beirut, the more desperate the 
situation became. Eight Marines had been killed during a fire fight in early 
December, and another died in January. As the violence continued, the 
American public turned against the Reagan administration's policy in Lebanon. 
Only 37% of Americans favored the withdrawal of Marines from the country in 
October, but by the end of January, 58% believed that it was time for the mission 
to end.67 Congress, of course, listened to the polls and began to put pressure on 
the administration. Despite the rising opposition, Reagan re-iterated his 
commitment to Lebanon on numerous occasions. The National Security Council 
even prepared an informational packet for the administration that could be 
distributed to Republicans in Congress. In essence, the packet was supposed to 
assist Reagan's supporters explain and defend American objectives in Lebanon to 
their constituents. Describing the country as "a flash point of confrontation 
between Israel and Syria, and potentially between the U.S. and USSR," the NSC
66 Wayne Biddle, "Poor Results In Shelling Laid To Old Ammunition," The New 
York Times, 23 October 1984: A15; see also Martin and Walcott, 146.
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60
document claimed that the "U.S. cannot ignore [the] consequences of just 
walking away." 68 The Congressional packet, in other words, claimed that 
Lebanon was vital to America's national security and credibility.
If Lebanon was truly so important to American interests, however, 
President Reagan would have never approved National Security Decision 
Directive 123 ("Next Steps in Lebanon") on February 1, 1984. NSDD 123 began 
with an outline of the three major military problems facing the Lebanese 
government, and it called for the military to provide more weapons and training 
to the LAF. By increasing aid to Gemayel's government, the decision directive 
suggested that the United States was simply continuing earlier policies. Yet on 
the second page of NSDD 123, Reagan ordered Weinberger and Vessey to 
construct a "timetable for the phase down of USMNF military personnel ashore 
and a plan for the continuing U.S. military presence offshore, taking full account 
of political as well as military considerations."69 Removing the Marines from the 
Beirut Airport and transferring them to nearby ships represented a major shift in 
policy. Although Reagan did not authorize the phase down of the military 
mission on February 1, he clearly was searching for a way out. Reagan, like 
Richard Nixon, wanted peace with honor; unlike Nixon, however, Reagan grew 
tired of waiting.
Despite what was happening behind the scenes, Reagan made public 
statements that were obviously misleading. On February 4, during a radio
68 "Arguments Against And For The Marine Presence In Lebanon," Ronald 
Reagan Library (White House Staff and Office Files: Fortier, Donald: Box 90753,
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69 National Security Decision Directive 123,1 February 1984, Ronald Reagan 
Library, 2.
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address from Camp David, he explained to Americans why the United States 
needed to uphold its commitment to the government of Lebanon: "Yes, the 
situation in Lebanon is difficult, frustrating and dangerous. But that is no reason 
to turn our backs and to cut and run. If we do, we'll be sending one signal to 
terrorists everywhere. They can gain by waging war against innocent people."70 
Three days later, while Reagan was making an appearance in Las Vegas, Vice 
President George Bush convened a meeting of the National Security Planning 
Group. Gemayel had lost control of West Beirut; Congress was demanding that 
the White House change its strategy; and even McFarlane now believed that the 
United States needed to withdraw. Interestingly, Secretary of State Shultz did 
not attend the NSPG meeting, since he had gone to Grenada, which had been 
invaded by American forces on October 25. Shultz's representative at the 
meeting, Lawrence Eagleburger, opposed the Marine withdrawal, but everyone 
else, including Bush, supported the proposal. Bush then called Reagan, who was 
now getting ready to leave for his California ranch on Air Force One, and 
informed the president what had transpired at the meeting. Reagan simply 
concurred with Bush and hung up the phone.7! As Lou Cannon has observed, 
Reagan authorized the withdrawal "in a phone conversation even briefer than 
the one in which he had originally authorized [Philip] Habib to commit the 
United States to participate in the MNF."77
On February 6, President Reagan had written a poignant letter to John 
Wandell. Wandell, a young sailor on the USS Guam, was stationed within
70 Reagan quoted in Cannon, 398.
71 Martin and Walcott, 150; Cannon, 399-400.
72 Cannon, 400.
striking distance of Lebanon at the time. Responding to an earlier note from 
Wandell, Reagan reminded him that "[w]e must not abandon those who have 
relied on our help to build a just and lasting p e a c e ." 7 3  By the time the letter 
reached its destination, Reagan had completely reversed his position. 
Administration officials claimed that the removal of American forces from the 
airport amounted to a re-deployment in which the United States would continue 
to assist the Lebanese government with the navy ships stationed offshore. In 
reality, though, everyone seemed to recognize that re-deployment was nothing 
more than a euphemism for the decision to cut and run.
Donald Rumsfeld, who had replaced McFarlane as the United States envoy 
to the Middle East, received the difficult task of informing Gemayel that the 
Marines were leaving the country. Rumsfeld and his staff armed themselves 
w ith handguns and made their way to Gemayel's personal bunker at the 
presidential palace. Since Rumsfeld had earlier promised Gemayel that the 
United States would not abandon Lebanon, he expected that the news would 
surprise him. Yet Gemayel reacted calmly to the visit, asking questions but not 
protesting. Rumsfeld later explained his deep sense of embarrassment at the 
meeting; "I just felt terrible," he said, "I felt sick to my s t o m a c h . " 7*
The Reagan administration, however, was not entirely finished with 
Lebanon. In what was perhaps the most vindictive display of military power 
since the Christmas bombings during the Vietnam War, the New Jersey fired 288 
sixteen inch shells at targets outside of Beirut on February 8, and on the
73 Reagan quoted in Wright, 97.
74 Rumsfeld quoted in Martin and Walcott, 151.
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following day, an American destroyer unleashed over one hundred r o u n d s . 75  
Walid Jumblatt, the architect of the National Salvation Front, initially claimed that 
the village of Tebyat had been annihilated. Journalists soon discovered that 
Jumblatt's report was exaggerated, but they also found evidence to indicate that 
the shelling had spread into civilian areas. In Tebyat, for instance, a sixteen inch 
shell from the New Jersey killed two and wounded sixteen. One resident of 
Tebyat questioned why the United States had targeted the village; "We have no 
terrorists here, we have no Palestinians here," he s a id .7 6  Unfortunately, it 
remains unclear how much damage the shelling inflicted on the civilian 
population. Although Druze leaders certainly had the tendency to overestimate 
the number of casualties, it is also clear that non-combatants were killed and 
wounded as a result of American naval f ir e .7 7  At the time, anonymous sources 
inside the Pentagon said that the shells "hit nothing of military significance," and 
Michael Burch, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, admitted that 
"there may have been some [collateral damage] and that would be
unfortunate."78
The final contingent of Marines withdrew from Lebanon at 12:37 in the 
afternoon on February 26. Shortly before leaving on a personnel carrier, Lance
75 "Navy's Guns Rake Hills Over Beirut With 150 Rounds," The New York Times,
10 February 1984: A l.
76 Judith Miller, "Tour Of 3 Lebanese Villages U.S. Ships Shelled Shows Less 
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Anthony McDermott and Kjell Skjelsbaek (Miami: Florida International University 
Press, 1991), 179.
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Corporal Shawn Lamb described how it felt to have served in Beirut. "You have
any good friends?" he asked reporter Thomas Friedman. "How would you like
to have them blown up in their sleep a thousand miles from home in a foreign
country--for nothing?" 79 Although some Marines stayed behind to protect the
American embassy and Army personnel continued to train the LAF, United
States involvement in the multinational force was now over. Within a few
minutes of the American departure, gunmen moved into the area surrounding
the airport and raised a green Amal flag where an American flag had once flown.
The men searched the former Marine headquarters, expressed some interest in
discarded Playboy magazines, and proceeded to secure the airport's r u n w a y s . 8 0
While the gunm en took control of the airport, the New Jersey and the
Caron, a destroyer, blasted their guns at the high ground over Beirut. 81 The 66
rounds fired on February 26 marked the senseless ending to a senseless foreign
policy in which nothing was gained and so much was lost. Perhaps a poem
written on the door frame of a Marine bunker at the airport summarized it best:
They sent us to Beirut
To be targets who could not shoot.
Friends will die into an early grave,
Was there any reason for what they gave?82
79 Thomas L. Friedman, "Marines Complete Beirut Pullback; Moslems Move In," 
The New York Times, 27 February 1984: A6.
so Ibid., A6.
si Ibid., A l.
82 Friedman, "America's Failure In Lebanon," 32.
Conclusion: The Legacy of Lebanon
If I ever say send in the Marines again [to Lebanon], somebody 
shoot me.~George Shultzi
On June 14, 1985, over a year after the United States withdrew from 
Lebanon, TWA Flight 847 took off from Athens with 153 people on board. 
Carrying 135 American passengers on their way to Rome, the plane was soon 
hijacked by two members of Hezbollah. Most of the American hostages did not 
understand why the enraged gunmen repeatedly yelled the words "New Jersey" 
and "Marines."^ As the episode unfolded, however, the references to American 
involvement in Lebanon gradually became more clear. The lead hijacker, who 
the passengers nicknamed Castro, declared at one point that his wife and child 
had been killed by bombs from the United States. 3 The hijackers extensively 
beat navy diver Robert Stethem, shot him, and then dum ped his body onto the 
runway in Beirut. They defended their action to the Beirut air traffic controller 
by reminding him of the Bir al Abed massacre in which the CIA allegedly 
organized a car bomb attack on Sheik Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah. The 
explosion in March 1985 had killed eighty Lebanese civilians but Fadlallah
survived.4
The hijackers shuttled their hostages between Beirut and Algiers for four 
days before they finally abandoned the aircraft in Beirut. When they evacuated 
the plane, they released almost all of the remaining hostages to the Amal militia.
1 Martin and Walcott, 148.
2 Cannon, 536.
3 Martin and Walcott, 173.
4 Cannon, 536.
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Thomas Murry, one of the Americans on TWA Flight 847, later recalled that the
final group of prisoners were taken in groups to apartments in south Beirut. The
Amal guards took Murry and the other hostages to locations that had been
attacked by the USS New Jersey in 1984, and on many occasions, they attempted
to explain to their captives why ordinary people resorted to terrorism.
According to a guard named Akal, for instance, the United States was directly
involved in the creation of international terrorism:
Think about a young man in southern Lebanon, a Shiite, 
who [is a] poor farmer. And he's out in the fields working.
And some of these Palestinians come in town and launch 
a rocket attack at the Israelis. The Israelis shoot back and 
[the] Palestinians are gone. And he gets home to find his 
family dead. And here is shell casings stuffed with 
American markings on it. And he's standing there looking 
at that, and a radical comes up and pats him on the shoulder 
and says, 'I'll show you how to get even.' And you've got 
[yourself a] terrorist .5
Akal, of course, definitely oversimplified the causes of terrorism, but in
retrospect, his observations are historically accurate, since much of the terrorist
activity directed at the United States during the Reagan years could be traced
back to American intervention in Lebanon between 1982 and 1984.
After the TWA Flight 847 hostages were released on June 30, Reagan went 
on national television to declare war on terrorism. "The United States gives 
terrorists no rewards and no guarantees," he said. "We make no concessions; 
we make no deals. Nations that harbor terrorists undermine their own stability 
and endanger their own people. Terrorists, be on notice, we will fight back
5 Quoted in Jeffrey D. Simon, The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience With 
Terrorism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 191.
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against you, in Lebanon and e l s e w h e r e . "  6 The Americans who listened to this 
speech did not know that their president had arranged the return of the hostages 
by promising the release of Shiite prisoners held in Israel. They also did not 
realize that high ranking officials within his administration were already working 
on a secret deal w ith Iran to get back the seven American citizens who had been 
kidnapped in Lebanon over the previous eighteen months.
As his predecessors had learned in Korea and Vietnam, and as Bill Clinton 
would later discover in Somalia, Lebanon taught Reagan that there were limits to 
America's military hegemony. Even the New Jersey, with its massive guns, could 
not stop hostile factions from killing and wounding Marines in Beirut. Rather 
than focusing attention on diplomatic solutions to the Lebanese crisis, Reagan, 
like Lyndon Johnson, believed that a military presence would somehow lead to a 
peaceful resolution. He repeatedly claimed that the United States would not 
abandon the Lebanese people. In fact, whenever Reagan commented on 
America's commitment to Lebanon, Beirut newspapers would frequently print 
the story on the first page. Not surprisingly, many people in Lebanon assumed 
that the United States would stand by these promises. Reagan's rhetoric, which 
routinely appeared in the newspapers and on the radio, gave them renewed 
confidence in the future of their country. "I thought the Americans had it all 
planned out and nothing could go wrong," recalled Nabil Yacoub. "They kept 
talking about all their plans and commitments. We thought there would be a 
new order in Lebanon patroned by the United States."? Much to Yacoub's
6 Reagan quoted in Ibid., 192-193.
? Yacoub quoted in Friedman, From Beirut To Jerusalem, 208.
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disappointment, however, Reagan abandoned Lebanon and did nothing to help 
when the country began to disintegrate.
While the withdrawal of the Marines in 1984 disillusioned supporters of the 
United States like Yacoub, enemies of America had much to celebrate. 
International terrorists learned from October 23 that one successful truck bomb 
had the ability to completely reverse American foreign policy, and in the 
aftermath of the deadly blast, it became apparent to them that Reagan's promise 
of swift and effective retribution had been transformed into a policy of inaction 
and retreat. "The message to them was clear," Jeffrey Simon has written, 
"[h]ijack the right plane at the right moment, or perpetrate some other dramatic 
attack, and you can bring the president of the most powerful nation in the world 
to address you and take notice of you." 8 Sadly, the Reagan administration 
missed an excellent opportunity to deter future terrorist attacks. The Long 
Commission, which investigated the barracks attack for the Department of 
Defense, assigned principal responsibility for the incident to the Marine 
commanders on the ground. At the same time, however, the Long Report 
warned that the United States was shockingly unprepared to confront 
international terrorism. The commission reminded policy makers "that state 
sponsored terrorism is an important part of the spectrum of warfare and that 
adequate response to this increasing threat requires an active national policy 
which seeks to deter attack or reduce its e f f e c t i v e n e s s . "  9 While recommending 
that the military place more emphasis on counter-terrorism, the report also
8 Simon, 193.
9 Report ofD O D  Commission, 14.
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outlined the need for diplomatic and political initiatives to address the problem.
The Reagan administration responded to the recommendations embodied 
in the Long Report, and on April 3, 1984, Reagan approved National Security 
Decision Directive 138. NSDD 138, which was primarily written by Oliver North, 
provided a blueprint for Reagan7 s war on terrorism. According to the decision 
directive, terrorism constituted a direct threat to the national security of the 
United States. Whenever terrorist groups attacked Americans, it called for the 
United States government to strike back at the perpetrators. Yet in the words of 
Noel Koch, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, NSDD 138 "was simply 
ignored. No part of it was ever implemented." *0 Frustrated with Reagan's 
failure to implement NSDD 138, Shultz turned to the American public. In 
numerous speeches and interviews, he warned that terrorism would only 
escalate in the years to come, and as a consequence, he said that the United States 
needed to take the offensive. "We can expect more terrorism directed at our 
strategic interests around the world in the years ahead," he told an audience 
gathered at the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York. "To combat it, we must 
be willing to use military force."11
Not surprisingly, Weinberger disagreed with Shultz's approach to the 
situation. In September 1984, a van loaded with explosives drove into the 
American embassy annex in East Beirut, killing two Americans and twelve 
Lebanese. Although the CIA traced the attack to the Sheik Abdullah Barracks, 
Weinberger successfully blocked plans for a retaliatory mission.12 He believed
Koch quoted in Martin and Walcott, 157.
11 Shultz quoted in Simon, 181.
12 Martin and Walcott, 158-159.
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that military force should be used with utmost caution. In November 1984, 
during a speech at the National Press Club, Weinberger outlined a set of 
principles that are now commonly referred to as the Weinberger Doctrine. 
Weinberger maintained that the United States should only use military 
intervention in situations where American interests were threatened and when 
the objectives were clearly defined and achievable. He emphasized fhat leaders 
m ust not commit American troops unless they had the support of the nation.!3
In essence, the ongoing feud between Weinberger and Shultz hampered 
the administration's ability to effectively implement a coherent policy on 
terrorism. Despite their many disagreements, however, they both viewed the 
problem . from a military perspective. The fundamental argument, in other 
words, pertained to the issue of retaliation. Shultz believed that the United States 
had an obligation to fight back, while Weinberger thought that counter­
offensives were a reckless waste of resources. The Reagan years were a 
formative time for international terrorism, and unfortunately, no one in the 
White House took a proactive stance on the issue. If the government of the 
United States had done more to carefully evaluate the causes of terrorism, it 
would have better equipped itself to alter the subsequent course of events. In 
the final analysis, America failed to take the initiative on counter-terrorism 
during the 1980s. Many officials were responsible for this failure, but none more 
so than Reagan himself. Howard Teicher, who worked for the National Security 
Council under Reagan, has provided one of the more revealing assessments of 
his boss. "Because he was unwilling to exercise leadership or to enforce discipline
13 Simon, 184.
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within his own cabinet/' according to Teicher, "history will judge Ronald Reagan 
a weak and indecisive m a n ." 1!
From beginning to end, American intervention in Lebanon was indicative 
of that weakness and indecision.
14 Teicher quoted in Martin and Walcott, 160.
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